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INTRODUCTION 
Space exploration is heating up. Governments and private interests 
are on a fast track to develop technologies to send people and equipment 
to celestial bodies, like the moon and asteroids, to extract their untapped 
resources.1 Near-space is rapidly filling up with public and private 
 
 †  Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. She thanks Georgetown for its 
generous support of her scholarship through the issuance of a summer writing grant. 
1.  See Andrew R. Brehm, Note, Private Property in Outer Space: Establishing a Foun-
dation for Future Exploration, 33 WIS. INT’L L.J. 353, 354 (2015); Ezra J. Reinstein, Owning 
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satellites, causing electromagnetic interference problems and dangerous 
space debris from collisions and earlier launches.2 The absence of a 
global management system for the private commercial development of 
outer space resources will allow these near space problems to be exported 
further into the galaxy.3 Moreover, without a governing authority or rules 
controlling entry or limiting despoliation, outer space could turn into the 
“Wild West” of the twenty-first century.4 
Space treaties executed in the last century espoused the principle that 
space should be developed for the benefit of all mankind and banned both 
private ownership and militarization of space resources.5 But, they left 
development of a system for managing non-military activities in outer 
space to another day.6 Private commercial interests, which would be 
absorbing the risks and paying the high costs of space development, 
oppose any management scenario premised on that principle, as it would 
enable less developed countries to free ride on their investments.7 These 
interests, unsurprisingly, support privatizing outer space.8 But acceding 
to their wishes by establishing a system of property-based rules would 
transport Earth’s current division between haves and have-nots into outer 
space, and could lead to destabilizing hostilities—the exact consequences 
that the early treaty drafters hoped to avoid.9 
To date, most scholars in this area have focused on developing 
management systems premised on private ownership or possession of the 
 
Outer Space, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 59, 59–60 (1999); Wilbur Ross, That Moon Colony? 
Maybe Not Far Off, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2018, at A23. 
2.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 64. This area is called the Geo-Stationary Orbit (GSO). Id. 
“The GSO is a loop of space about Earth’s equatorial surface,” where most satellites are 
placed. Id. This narrow band of space is cluttered with “electromagnetic interference from 
rival satellites . . . and with ‘space junk,’ debris from past launches that threatens to rip holes 
in the orbiting equipment.” Id. At the same time, the GSO is “the most valuable of all space 
resources to date.” Id. at 65. “[T]he private-sector investment in telecommunications satellites 
has become a billion-dollar industry.” Carol R. Buxton, Property in Outer Space: The Com-
mon Heritage of Mankind Principle vs. the “First in Time, First in Right” Rule of Property 
Law, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 689, 703 (2004). 
3.  See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 62–63. 
4.  See id. at 72 (“Any legal regime should guard against inefficient exploitation, waste, 
and environmental despoliation. Furthermore, space should not become the next Wild West. 
Destruction and sabotage must be discouraged.”). 
5.  See id. at 62, 66, 69. 
6.  See id. at 71–72. 
7.  See id. at 74. 
8.  See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 72; see also Brehm, supra note 1, at 355. 
9.  See Buxton, supra note 2, at 700 (“Referring to the ‘first in time, first in right’ prop-
erty principle that dominated the earth for thousands of years, Arthur J. Goldberg, the U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations General Assembly stated, ‘[A]s we stand on the thresh-
old of the [S]pace [A]ge, our first responsibility as governments is clear: we must make sure 
that man’s earthly conflicts will not be carried into outer space . . . .’”). 
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surface of some celestial body.10 This Article explores an alternative 
concept, the commons, in which no individual owns the property in 
question or can exclude others from it. Viewing property as a commons 
is closer to the principles set out in the various space treaties than 
implementation of a private property regime, and also offers a workable 
property regime. This Article demonstrates these conclusions by showing 
similarities between a large, Earth-bound commons, like the ocean and 
outer space, and how various commons management scenarios allow 
equitable use of resources, while preventing their despoliation and 
devolution into hostile disputes over entitlements to them. However, each 
of these commons management scenarios is flawed in some way and runs 
a similar risk to management approaches for private property of allowing 
the resource to be over-used or inequitably distributed. 
The public trust doctrine (PTD), an ancient doctrine that 
governments and individuals have used effectively for centuries to 
protect the public’s interests in terrestrial common pool resources (CPR) 
and to fill regulatory gaps, can be helpful in both respects.11 An 
examination of the doctrine identifies commonalities between outer space 
and terrestrial public trust resources.12 The ease and low cost of its 
implementation and enforcement, as well as its infinite malleability, are 
additional reasons to select it as a stopgap measure with some 
modification.13 
This Article’s structure is straight forward. Part I acquaints the 
reader with the problem. It explains why the need to develop a 
management regime for space is becoming increasingly critical as 
advancing technology is allowing more and more private commercial 
interests to play at the edge of outer space with attendant negative 
externalities.14 Soon these technological advances will allow private 
commercial interests to invade outer space with the potential for similar 
adverse impacts.15 Part II examines the international legal framework 
governing those activities and finds it lacks any capacity to regulate 
 
10.  See, e.g., Brehm supra note 1, at 374; Reinstein, supra note 1, at 72.  
11.  See Hope M. Babcock, Using the Federal Public Trust Doctrine to Fill Gaps in the 
Legal Systems Protecting Migrating Wildlife from the Effects of Climate Change, 95 NEB. L. 
REV. 649, 651 (2017). 
12.  See id. at 651–52. 
13.  See id. at 678–79.  
14.  See Ross, supra note 1. 
15.  See id. (describing touting the creation of a Space Policy Advancing Commercial En-
terprise Administration in the Secretary of the Department of Commerce’s office to establish 
a one-stop shop to assist “the budding private space sector”); see also Mike Ives, China Makes 
Move Into Outer Space, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2018, at A11 (describing China’s ambitious 
plans to land an unmanned space craft on the far side of the moon by the end of this year, as 
well as put a person on the moon and send a mission to Mars by 2025). 
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activities in outer space, in part because it is riddled with ambiguities and 
contradictions when it comes to ownership of outer space and its 
resources. 
Part III turns to that problem by discussing two types of property: 
private property and property owned in common with others. It examines 
the key features of each as well as their positive and negative attributes, 
how each might function in outer space, and what the consequences might 
be if one or the other prevailed. Because any property arrangement that 
results in its appropriation by the owner and the exclusion of others 
violates international space law, Part III also identifies various less-than-
full fee property arrangement, like leases and easements, to see if these 
problems can be avoided and concludes they cannot.16 It then examines 
property held in common to determine its viability under international 
space law and finds it consistent. 
Part IV investigates various approaches to managing property in 
outer space, be it held in private ownership or in common. Different 
approaches for managing private property in space are explored, 
including the right of first possession, tradable property claims, and 
establishing an exclusive economic zone, as well for managing an open 
access commons, such as the application of stewardship principles, 
norms, and the PTD. Each approach is evaluated in terms of its 
consistency with international law; its ability to promote and protect a 
sustainable, equitable, non-monopolistic, non-hostile environment in 
outer space; its efficiency; and its cost effectiveness. Only the PTD, 
which has been used for centuries to protect the public’s interests in CPRs 
and has demonstrated its ability to adapt to new circumstances, may be 
able to meet these goals.17 This Article finds commonalities between 
outer space and Earth-bound public trust resources, like the oceans. 
Additionally, the doctrine’s open access purpose resonates with language 
found in international treaties governing activities in outer space.18 
This Article concludes that using the PTD will lead to a durable, 
equitable management regime in a commons where the wealthy are 
neither able to accumulate and control the resources that outer space has 
to offer nor over-exploit and deplete them. However, neither the doctrine 
nor ownership in common supplies any incentives for development, 
which may lead private enterprises to question whether development of 
outer space resources is worth the risks and costs.19 But, limited use of 
 
16.  See Brehm, supra note 1, at 360. 
17.  See Babcock, supra note 11.  
18.  See id. at 678. 
19.  See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 61. 
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private property management approaches, like lotteries and tradable 
development claims—a form of overlapping hybridity between one type 
of property, a commons, and a management regime from another, private 
property—may fill this gap.20 This Article’s contribution to the literature 
on managing outer space resources and commons theory is using the PTD 
to bridge the gap between them and to suggest a hybrid management 
approach that melds commons theory with private property incentives. 
I. OFF TO THE RACES 
“As we push human exploration deeper into space, we will unleash the 
boundless potential of America’s pioneering commercial space compa-
nies.”21 
Humans have always looked to the heavens and marveled, 
wondering what is there.22 Today, we know more about what might be 
there, which has spurred a race among nations and private enterprises to 
be the first to reap the economic benefits that outer space may have to 
offer.23 This Part introduces the reader to the modern history of that race 
and some of the benefits and perils that it presents. 
There is not a single definition of exactly what outer space is.24 The 
United States employs a functional definition—i.e., outer space exists 
“wherever a preordained set of outer space activities takes place,” such 
as an orbiting satellite.25 A competing “popular” definition draws “a line 
above which everything is considered to be outer space.”26 The boundary 
line used for this theory “is approximately 96 to 110 kilometers above the 
[e]arth’s surface, which is the lowest altitude at which a satellite can 
currently maintain orbit.”27 
However, while the precise legal contours of what constitutes outer 
space is relevant for treaties governing activities in outer space, it is of 
less concern here than are the resources that are on celestial bodies in 
outer space and the claims that nations and private entities make to 
 
20.  See discussion infra Part V. 
21.  Vice President Mike Pence, Remarks at the 34th Space Symposium (Apr. 16, 2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-34th-space-
symposium-colorado-springs-co/.  
22.  See Davin Widgerow, Comment, Boldly Going Where No Realtor Has Gone Before: 
The Law of Outer Space and a Proposal for a New Interplanetary Property Law System, 28 
WIS. INT’L L.J. 490, 493 (2011) (“[T]he natural human tendency to explore uncharted frontiers 
demands a human return to space.”). 
23.  See id. at 492–93. 
24.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 95. 
25.  Id. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. 
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them.28 Some of these resources are very valuable and, if they exist on 
Earth, are extremely rare.29 It is the economic benefit of these resources 
that fuels the current space race among the numerous nations and private 
enterprises.30 The history of this current space race and space exploration 
in general, commonly referred to as the “Space Age,” can be traced back 
to the mid-1950s.31 
The Space Age began in 1957 with the Soviet launch of the first 
satellite (“Sputnik I”) into space, followed shortly by the United States’ 
launch of Explorer I.32 Fifty years after Sputnik I, over 115 countries 
owned or shared ownership of an orbiting satellite.33 Since then, countries 
and private companies have made 5,000 launches.34 As of 2011, there 
were over 950 operational satellites circling the earth.35 
By 2005, China, which established its space program a scant thirteen 
years earlier in 1992, employed “tens of thousands of scientific, 
manufacturing and planning personnel in more than 3,000 factories.”36 
The Chinese beat their goal of launching a manned flight to outer space 
in 2005 by nearly two years.37 Five countries intend to go to the moon by 
2020, and the United States expects to establish a permanently staffed 
station by 2024.38 In fact, 
 
28.  See Stephen DiMaria, Note, Starships and Enterprise: Private Spaceflight Compa-
nies’ Property Rights and the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, 90 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV., 415, 419 (2016). Resources in outer space are either res communis, “to be 
enjoyed and shared by all people in common,” or res nullius, not subject to being owned, “but 
attainable by the first person to occupy of capture the property.” Id. “In line with the interna-
tional obligations guiding [the U.S. Space Launch Competitiveness Act], outer space is no 
longer purely res nullius, because the Outer Space Treaty has imposed some environmental 
restrictions and a requirement of international cooperation.” Id. at 433. 
29.  Sarah Coffey, Note, Establishing a Legal Framework for Property Rights to Natural 
Resources in Outer Space, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 119, 120 (2009) (“The moon, Mars, 
and other celestial bodies contain resources that are scarce or non-existent on Earth and which 
could have immense value. One example is helium-3, a substance common on the moon but 
exceedingly scarce on Earth. Helium-3 has better potential for providing clean, efficient en-
ergy than any other source currently known on Earth.”). 
30.  Widgerow, supra note 22, at 492–93. 
31.  See Jared B. Taylor, Note, Tragedy of the Space Commons: A Market Mechanism 
Solution to the Space Debris Problem, 50 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 253, 258 (2011). 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Emily M. Nevala, Comment, Waste in Space: Remediating Space Debris Through the 
Doctrine of Abandonment and the Law of Capture, 66 AM. U.L. REV. 1495, 1497 (2017). 
35.  Taylor, supra note 31, at 256. 
36.  April Greene Apking, Note, The Rush to Develop Space: The Role of Spacefaring 
Nations in Forging Environmental Standards for the Use of Celestial Bodies for Governmen-
tal and Private Interests, 16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 429, 434–35 (2005). 
37.  Id. at 435. 
38.  Coffey, supra note 29, at 120; see also id. at 123 (“[A]t least six nations and numerous 
private companies have plans to go to the moon in the near future. NASA’s Vision for Space 
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[a] recent [National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)]-
funded study estimated that the United States, in partnership with 
private industry, could return humans to the moon in as little as five to 
seven years for about $10 billion. That same study also contemplated 
the possibilities of an estimated $40 billion lunar base, which would 
dramatically cut costs in future missions to Mars.39 
“In March 2004, the European Space Agency successfully launched 
the Rosetta Spacecraft from Kourou, French Guiana. Over $1.5 billion, 
ten years, and four billion miles later, the [spacecraft] released a 
sophisticated 220-pound probe called the ‘Philae,’ which landed on 
Comet 67P/Churyumov-Gerasimenko on November 12, 2014,” the first 
time any country or company has achieved this.40 “During its year-long 
stay on Comet 67P, the Philae probe has drilled into the surface to collect 
samples, taken a series of photographs, and conducted a swath of 
experiments, . . . provid[ing] never-before-seen data that has the potential 
to shed light on the origins of the universe.”41 
Once the European Union demonstrated the ability to land on a 
comet, the idea of landing on a resource rich asteroid came closer to 
reality.42 Asteroids, the “similarly situated cousins” of comets, “present 
potentially extraordinary incentives for mining and exploitation.”43 The 
low gravity of asteroids decreases the amount of fuel required to land and 
take off from the asteroid’s surface, reducing the cost of asteroid mining 
to a more “palatable” level.44 Additionally, “[w]ater, extracted from 
hydrated clay minerals present on asteroids, can be harvested and turned 
into hydrogen rocket fuel, giving asteroids the potential to be deep space 
 
Exploration aims to send astronauts back to the moon in 2020 and to establish a permanently 
staffed base by 2024.”); Apking, supra note 36, at 437 (“Japan, Brazil, France, and the Euro-
pean Union . . . represent examples of countries only recently venturing into space.”). But see 
Brehm, supra note 1, at 371 (“As of 2013, only eleven nations had functioning space pro-
grams. There are even fewer countries where private space exploration entities exist.”).  
39.  DiMaria, supra note 28, at 415. 
40.  Elliot Reaven, Note, The United States Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness 
Act: The Creation of Private Space Property Rights and the Omission of the Right to Freedom 
from Harmful Interference, 94 WASH. U.L. REV. 233, 233 (2016).  
41.  Id. 
42.  See Kevin MacWhorter, Sustainable Mining: Incentivizing Asteroid Mining in the 
Name of Environmentalism, 40 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 645, 652 (2016) (“With 
the European Space Agency successfully landing the Philae Lander on Comet 67P, it is much 
more plausible to land a mining operation on an asteroid.”); Reaven, supra note 40, at 234 
(“[P]roof of our ability to land on a comet makes the idea of landing on and potentially exca-
vating an asteroid more realistic.”). 
43.  See Reaven, supra note 40, at 234. 
44.  Id. 
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gas stations.”45 
Not just countries are launching spacecraft into outer space; space 
flights by private ventures are thriving.46 Companies like Planetary 
Resources, Inc., and Deep Space Industries (DSI) have initiated programs 
and actual launching tests for prospecting profitable resources on 
asteroids.47 A study by the Keck Institute for Space Studies estimates that 
bringing an asteroid back to Earth’s orbit would cost only $2.6 billion, 
which would be offset by the economic benefits of “harvesting precious 
metals, helium-3, and even water.”48 
Private investment in space, not foreseen when the international 
framework regulating activities in space was put into place, has grown, 
while government investment in space has “shrunk.”49 Although the 
expenditures of NASA have increased since 1958, its overall budget “as 
a percentage of U.S. spending has decreased dramatically.”50 NASA, in 
the aftermath of retiring its shuttle fleet in 2011, has relied increasingly 
on private contractors to design and build spacecrafts.51 In response to 
these federal cutbacks, the private space industry has grown 
dramatically.52 
Illustrating that trend, between 1996 and 2001, experts predicted that 
“private-sector investment in telecommunications satellites alone” would 
equal $54.3 billion (including launch)—an amount that does not include 
other commercial space ventures or investment in Russian and Chinese 
 
45.  Id. at 235. “Since asteroids can serve as a water source throughout the galaxy, incen-
tivizing commercial asteroid development serves the additional purpose of increasing the ca-
pacity for human space flight.” Id. at 252. 
46.  Brehm, supra note 1, at 378 (“The dawning of the new millennium has coincided with 
the creation of a new vehicle for understanding outer space—private space exploration.”).  
47.  DiMaria, supra note 28, at 415. 
48.  Id. at 415–16. 
49.  See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 98 (stating that an indication of this shrink is that com-
mercial space activities currently “generate more revenues than government contracts”); 
Widgerow, supra note 22, at 499 (“The apparent reason for this explosion in space investment 
is that private space ventures promise great profits should they be realized . . . .”). 
50.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 650. Contradicting this trend, in 2014, NASA re-
quested a budget that included “$105 million to begin work on a mission that would send a 
robotic spacecraft to capture an asteroid as early as 2019 and haul it back so that astronauts 
could rendezvous with it by 2022.” Id. at 653. In 2017, NASA closed out its mission to collect 
a large boulder from an asteroid and bring it back to Earth. Jeff Foust, NASA Closing Out 
Asteroid Redirect Mission, SPACE NEWS (June 14, 1017), http://spacenews.com/nasa-closing-
out-asteroid-redirect-mission. 
51.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 650 (“That year, NASA awarded four private space 
companies—SpaceX, Blue Origin LLC, Boeing Co., and Sierra Nevada Corp.—contracts 
worth a combined total of $269.3 million to transport cargo and crew to and from the Inter-
national Space Station. More companies, such as Orbital Sciences, have followed suit.”). 
52.  Id. 
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satellites.53 An additional “$70 billion was projected to be invested in 
satellite communications ground stations over the same period.”54 
Research is discovering “phenomena unique to the low- and no-gravity 
environment of space” with the possibility of “space-based processing of 
new alloys.”55 “Engineers have considered the possibility of capturing 
solar energy in massive quantities by laying out giant cells in space and 
on our moon.”56 
Private space flights are on the cusp of becoming a reality. In 
October 2012, a private company, SpaceX, launched “the first official 
commercial flight to the International Space Station [(ISS)].”57 Since its 
first launch, SpaceX has sent sixteen missions to the ISS58 and has 
successfully launched a reusable rocket.59 Another company, Planetary 
Resources, has invested millions of dollars in “plans to mine asteroids for 
their mineral resources in the near future,” while other companies are 
focusing on their efforts in extracting valuable materials from the moon.60 
The founders of Google have made large investments in private space 
flight.61 Google offered $30 million in prizes to any team who, before 
2016, could (1) land a robot on the moon’s surface, (2) have it travel 1,640 
feet over the moon’s surface, and then (3) transmit video images and data 
back to Earth,62 but as of March 2018, no one had won the prize and the 
competition was over.63 
It is indisputable that “reservoirs of great wealth sit untapped in 
space.”64 However, only recently has technology advanced to a point 
 
53.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 59. 
54.  Id. 
55.  Id. “The field of biotechnology is also taking advantage of zero-gravity conditions to 
manufacture protein crystals, which the pharmaceutical industry can use to create drugs that 
are able to ‘turn off’ a protein, thereby regulating metabolic processes.” Id. at 59–60. 
56.  Id. at 60. 
57.  Brian Abrams, First Contact: Establishing Jurisdiction Over Activities in Outer 
Space, 42 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 797, 799 (2014). 
58.  Missions, SPACEX, https://www.spacex.com/missions (last visited Mar. 6, 2019). 
59.  About SpaceX, SPACEX, https://www.spacex.com/missions (last visited Mar. 6, 2019) 
(“SpaceX successfully achieved the historic first reflight of an orbital class rocket in 2017, 
and the company now regularly launches flight-proven rockets. In 2018, SpaceX began 
launching Falcon Heavy, the world’s most powerful operational rocket by a factor of two.”). 
Currently, SpaceX is working to create the “next generation of fully reusable launch vehicles 
that will be the most powerful ever built, capable of carrying humans to Mars and other des-
tinations in the solar system.” Id. 
60.  Abrams, supra note 57. 
61.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 650. 
62.  Id. 
63.  Loren Grush, It’s Official: No One Is Going to Win the Google Lunar X Prize Com-
petition, VERGE (Jan. 23, 2018, 3:14 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/31/17176530/ 
 google-lunar-x-prize-competition-spaceil-moon-express-astrobotic.  
64.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 72.  
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where resources can be extracted from asteroids.65 The most 
economically promising development activity in outer space is mining 
celestial bodies like the moon and asteroids.66 Asteroids’ “zero gravity 
fields and availability of metals” have made them serious “candidates for 
resource extraction since the beginning of the [S]pace [A]ge.”67 “The 
estimated [h]elium-3 reserves on our moon would create, in a controlled 
fusion reaction, [ten] times as much energy as is contained in Earth’s 
recoverable coal, oil, and gas combined.”68 Evidence is growing that 
some near-Earth asteroids “contain gold, rhenium, germanium, and 
platinum-group metals—platinum, palladium, iridium, osmium, 
rhodium, and ruthenium—at concentrations of up to 100 times those that 
are mined on Earth.”69 Metals like iron, gold, and platinum are important 
to many current technologies.70 “Astrophysicists estimate that each 
[asteroid] could contain 30 million tons of nickel, 1.5 million tons of 
cobalt, and 7,500 tons of platinum, among other minerals. To put that in 
economic terms, the value of each asteroid could be ‘somewhere in the 
trillions [of dollars] or higher.’”71 
The attractiveness of these resources is increased by the fact that 
“certain elements crucial to modern industry—such as platinum, zinc, 
copper, phosphorous, lead, gold, and indium—could be exhausted on 
Earth. Many of these have no synthetic alternative, unlike chemical 
elements.”72 
[T]he energy required to extract minerals from an asteroid is 
considerably less than to extract from the [e]arth, or even the moon . . ., 
because in space there is no atmosphere to oxidise [sic] or salt to 
corrode, no weather, no gravity or friction to oppose transportation, 
dissipate energy and waste heat and unlimited heat from the sun and 
coldness in space for refrigeration, creating the “perfect vacuum” . . . .73 
These materials could augment Earth’s diminishing supply of these 
 
65.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 652. 
66.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 60. 
67.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 652.  
68.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 61 (emphasis added). 
69.  Id. at 60. “Glenn Reynolds has observed, ‘The smallest known near-[E]arth metal 
asteroid contains more metal than has been mined by humanity since the beginning of time.’ 
It has been estimated that 2,000 NEAs larger than 1 km in diameter exist.” Id. 
70.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 652.  
71.  Id. 
72.  Id. at 647. “[D]espite their high costs, platinum group metals are so useful that [one] 
of [four] industrial goods on Earth require them in production.” Id. at 648. 
73.  Nilima Choudhury, Asteroid Minerals Mining to be Achieved Within Five Years, 
INDUS. MIN. (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.indmin.com/Article/3319663/Asteroid-minerals-
mining-to-beachieved-within-five-years.html (summarizing the remarks of Chris Lewicki, 
President of Planetary Resources). 
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resources.74 For example, the moon may contain a sufficient amount of 
helium-3 to meet “the world’s energy needs through fusion reactors,”75 
giving it one of the best “potential[s] for providing clean, efficient energy 
[of all the] other possible source[s] currently known on Earth.”76 The 
development of helium-3 and other resources on the moon, like water, 
“could provide the raw materials for a manned outpost’s fuel, 
construction materials, and life support systems” in outer space.77 
Asteroids are also “rich in ruthenium, rhodium, osmium, iridium, and 
platinum,” which are not found in any significant quantities on Earth.78 
These materials are important for the development of electronics.79 
Development of these materials could lower the cost of electronics.80 An 
additional inducement to developing outer space resources is that the 
terrestrial extraction of these materials can cause significant 
environmental damage.81 The fact that exploiting the mineral resources 
found on asteroids would avoid completely, or reduce significantly, the 
harmful environmental and sociological effects of terrestrial mining82 and 
would be enabled by investment dollars warrants “serious inquiry” into 
the activity’s future.83 
 
74.  Apking, supra note 36, at 432. Apking also notes that the availability of these re-
sources makes outer space livable, which might help counter Earth’s “swelling population.” 
Id. 
75.  David Johnson, Comment, Limits on the Giant Leap for Mankind: Legal Ambiguities 
of Extraterrestrial Resource Extraction, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1477, 1480 (2011) (“The 
moon alone is believed to contain enough [h]elium-3 to supply the world’s energy needs 
through fusion reactors.”). 
76.  Coffey, supra note 29, at 121–22. 
77.  Johnson, supra note 75, at 1480–81. “Thus, the fate of space exploration and enter-
prise may depend on whether astronauts can make use of the celestial environment, rather 
than rely on terrestrial resources.” Id. at 1481. 
78.  Brehm, supra note 1; see also Reinstein, supra note 1, at 60 (“Many of these [near-
Earth asteroids] seem to be rich in raw materials that are either rare and valuable on Earth, or 
common on Earth, needed in space, but expensive to launch.”). 
79.  Brehm, supra note 1 (“These elements are extremely rare on Earth and are important 
materials in developing electronics. . . . [E]ach of these platinum group elements draws a high 
market price, creating incentives to explore space for entrepreneurs and investors alike.”). 
80.  Id. at 355. 
81.  See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 65. 
82.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 647–48.  
 
[B]y extracting tiny amounts of metals from relatively large quantities of ore, the min-
ing industry contributes the largest portion of solid wastes in the world. The Environ-
mental Protection Agency . . . describes the industry as the source of “more toxic and 
hazardous waste than any other industrial sector [in the United States], costing billions 
of dollars to address the public health and environmental threats to communities.”  
 
 Id. at 648. 
83.  Id. at 646–47. “The economic benefits of mining need not be sacrificed for the sake 
of the environment.” Id. at 649. 
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Colonization of outer space might also help with terrestrial over-
population.84 The moon has potential for use as a base that might allow 
for testing of equipment and development of necessary skills for a 
manned mission to Mars.85 By providing the platform for “a deep space 
observatory,” the moon might “replace the Hubble space telescope and 
allow for better quality pictures” because the orbit of the Hubble 
telescope is only 250 miles from Earth, while the [m]oon’s orbit is 
240,000 miles.86 
An indication of how seriously private companies view the 
possibility of mining asteroids is several billionaire investors—including 
two Google executives, a Hollywood director, and Ross Perot, Jr.— who 
in 2012 announced that they were investing heavily in a company called 
Planetary Resources, which is developing the technology to mine a near-
Earth asteroid and bring those materials back to Earth.87 The company 
hopes to do this by creating small spacecrafts that can “hitch a ride into 
space with larger, primary payloads.”88 Another company, DSI, which 
was created for the purpose of extracting and harvesting materials from 
asteroids, 
is developing a four-stage system for mining in space: Prospecting, 
Processing, Harvesting, and Manufacturing. It has already invented one 
spacecraft to be used for the Prospecting stage: a tiny probe, called 
FireFly, designed to scout asteroids and study their “size, shape, spin 
and composition . . . .” For the Processing phase, DSI is creating 
technology required to “transform regolith to raw materials” for 
manufacture. The company is currently developing another spacecraft, 
called a Harvestor, for the third stage to collect and transport resources. 
Finally, the company is creating technology to manufacture finished 
products in space.89 
Planetary Resources also “hopes to mine hydrogen fuels” from 
asteroids, which could then be used to power expeditions deeper into 
space.90 DSI has “an end goal of using the materials to support outer space 
 
84.  See id. at 60 (“Colonization—pushing humanity’s living room beyond its ‘surly 
bonds’—might, depending on how it [is] implemented, represent a complete answer to the 
potential disaster of overpopulation and its effects.”).  
85.  Apking, supra note 36, at 440. But see Reinstein, supra note 1, at 63 (noting that while 
the moon may be a very “promising [site] for mining, energy-capture projects, and spaceship 
refueling,” it has a limited amount of usable water). 
86.  Apking, supra note 36, at 440 (saying the moon could take the place of the behind-
schedule and over-budget the ISS, which is of limited use anyway). 
87.  Brehm, supra note 1; MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 650–51. 
88.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 653. 
89.  Id. at 653 (internal footnotes omitted); see also Brehm, supra note 1. 
90.  Brehm, supra note 1. 
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communities and fuel further exploration.”91 “In 2011, Microsoft 
billionaire Naveen Jain announced the creation of Moon Express, a 
private space exploration entity that plans to mine for platinum and 
titanium on the [m]oon.”92 And in that same year, a “venture start-up 
Shackleton Energy Company launched fund-raising efforts, ultimately 
seeking to mine the Shackleton Crater in the [m]oon’s south pole for fuels 
to propel deeper space expeditions.”93 
Space tourism by private companies is “on the rise.”94 Experts 
estimate that space tourism will be worth $1 billion by 2023.95 Private 
companies are developing the capacity to take passengers on a “quick 
jaunt into outer space.”96 These ventures will 
include space hotels (profits estimated at $5 billion a year by 2015), 
contracting with NASA to send humans to Mars (profits at $400 billion 
by 2030), orbital labs for the development of microchips and biotech 
devices (profits at $10 billion by 2015), solar satellites and electricity 
($100 billion by 2020), a space elevator that aims to replace rockets ($2 
billion by 2021), asteroid mineral mining ($10 billion by 2030), [and] 
lunar mining ($354 billion by 2050). . . . Clearly, private industry has 
economic incentives motivating it to invest in space exploration and 
technologies.97 
The sale of land on asteroids and the moon is also proceeding apace. 
Some believe that “[p]eople will line up to pay money for recognized 
titles to acres of speculative Lunar real estate just because they are part 
of mankind’s first permanent space settlement, which offers regular 
transportation back and forth, so the land could someday be developed, 
and theoretically, they could visit someday.”98 Denis Hope, founder of 
Lunar Embassy, 
sold 3,500 “properties” in the first sixteen years of the [company’s 
existence], and since 1998 he has managed a two-tier “reselling” 
program, whereby current owners of Hope’s lunar property could, in 
turn, sell their properties to other buyers. In December 2005, there were 
 
91.  Id. at 354–55. 
92.  Id. at 355. 
93.  Id.  
94.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 650; see also Apking, supra note 36, at 444 (describ-
ing various initiatives by private companies to develop tourist trade, including sending cap-
sules containing personal property of customers like business cards, jewelry, and even cre-
mated remains, to the moon). 
95.  Widgerow, supra note 22, at 499. 
96.  Abrams, supra note 57, at 799–800. 
97.  Widgerow, supra note 22, at 499 (internal footnote omitted). 
98.  Alan Wasser & Douglas Jobes, Space Settlements, Property Rights, and International 
Law: Could a Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate It Needs to Survive?, 73 J. AIR 
L. & COM. 37, 75 (2008). 
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twenty-seven reselling agents in the United States, and his 
“Ambassadorship” program has representatives in fifteen countries. 
While the international community has thus far ignored Hope, the 
proliferation of copycat companies selling lunar realty symbolizes the 
persistent enthusiasm that space ownership holds for thousands of 
people.99 
All this activity in space has not been without environmental cost. 
For example, one residue of the presence of humans and their equipment 
in outer space has been space debris, which can cause damage to 
functional satellites.100 Even microparticulate debris like paint chips can 
cause damage to the surface of satellites and spacecraft, an example of 
which was the need to replace part of the Space Shuttle Challenger’s 
windshield as a result of a crack caused by a single paint chip.101 In 2009, 
the first time two intact satellites crashed into each other, a non-functional 
Russian satellite crashed into a functioning American communications 
satellite, releasing “upwards of 2,000 pieces of orbital debris.”102 Two 
years earlier, China destroyed a weather satellite as part of an anti-
satellite missile test that produced “2,500 pieces of orbital debris.”103 
 
99.  Widgerow, supra note 22, at 501–02 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 
This issue was brought under consideration when Greg Nemitz brought suit against 
NASA seeking declaratory judgment concerning alleged property rights in the aster-
oid Eros. Nemitz officially published a claim of ownership to Asteroid 433, Eros. 
Eleven months later, NASA’s NEAR Shoemaker spacecraft landed on Eros. Nemitz 
sent NASA a twenty-dollar invoice for parking and storage fees. NASA refused to 
pay and Nemitz brought suit. Nemitz’s action was dismissed, however, for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court found that Nemitz had failed 
to establish a legally recognizable property interest in Eros.  
 
Brehm, supra note 1, at 359–60. 
100.  Nevala, supra note 34, at 1498; see also Hugh Lewis, Trouble in Orbit: The Growing 
Problem of Space Junk, BBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/science-envi-
ronment-33782943 (“In 2014, the [ISS] had to move three times to avoid lethal chunks of 
space debris.”); Jillian Scudder, How Do We Clean Up All that Space Debris?, FORBES (Jan. 
6, 2016, 7:18 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jillianscudder/2016/01/06/astroquizzical-
space-debris/#1583bce31a3b (noting that even paint-flake debris can cause serious damage 
to spacecraft). 
101.  See Taylor, supra note 31, at 262 (“Though small, microparticulate debris can still 
damage the outer surfaces of satellites and spacecraft. For example, a portion of the Space 
Shuttle Challenger’s windshield was cracked by a paint chip only two-tenths of a millimeter 
in size, necessitating its replacement after the mission’s conclusion.”). In fact, “[m]ost debris 
orbits with enough momentum to damage or destroy anything in its path.” Id. at 255. 
102.  Nevala, supra note 34, at 1498. 
103.  Id. at 1497–98. “Experts consider[ed] this [to be] ‘the most prolific and serious frag-
mentation’ in space exploration history.” Id. There are “[a]pproximately 15,000 catalogued 
pieces of space debris currently orbit[ing] the [e]arth, and this amount increases every year.” 
Taylor, supra note 31, at 255.  
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Experts think that 194 satellites have come apart in orbit.104 
Space debris can remain in orbit up to thousands of years105 and, if 
not controlled or removed, could “render space useless.”106 Because 
international treaties governing space “encourage[] and facilitate[] the 
use of space at the expense of environmental regulation,” they have little 
to offer in the way of managing the debris problem.107 By assuring that 
orbital space can be accessed and polluted by anyone “as a common 
property resource,”108 “no country fully internalizes the costs of the space 
debris it creates and thus no country has a strong incentive to limit or 
reduce its space debris.”109 The lack of physical boundaries also makes it 
difficult to assign property rights in and responsibilities for the removal 
or control of these materials.110 
Additionally, the projected presence of humans in outer space could 
be a source of contamination of the surface of any celestial body they 
encounter.111 Examples of this “include fuel spills from mining 
operations, abandoned structures cluttering the moonscape, problems of 
disposal of human waste in large quantities, and depletion of various 
natural resources.”112 Although unlikely, given the fact that “only well-
established companies with the capital and resources to invest in asteroid 
mining will be able to mine asteroids,”113 there is also the possibility that 
all these private ventures, particularly mining, will create something akin 
to the lawless California Gold Rush in outer space.114 
 
104.  Taylor, supra note 31, at 261. 
105.  Id. at 257. 
106.  Id. at 255; see also Reinstein, supra note 1, at 65 (“Orbiting litter may soon seriously 
hinder our ability to maintain a global communications link.”).  
107.  Taylor, supra note 31, at 255. 
108.  Id. 
109.  Id. at 260. 
110.  Id. at 258 (“[S]imilar to the ocean and its tides, the physical characteristics of [Low 
Earth Orbit] make the establishment of traditional, spatially demarcated property rights im-
practical.”).  
111.  Apking, supra note 36, at 445.  
112.  Id.; see also Reinstein, supra note 1, at 65 (“The importance of an environmentalist 
ethos in this context derives, in part, from the concerns we already deal with on Earth: the 
preservation of the natural environment for its own sake and for our communal survival, as 
well as the conservation of natural resources.”). But see MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 676 
(“While astroenvironmentalism is a laudable goal in some areas of commercial space ven-
tures, it does not apply to the exploitation of asteroids. Asteroids are uninhabitable. They have 
zero gravity, no atmosphere, and are found in ‘the “perfect vacuum.”‘ Exploiting asteroids 
‘damages no ecospheres since they are lifeless rocks left over from the formation of the solar 
system.’”).  
113.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 669. 
114.  Id. at 674–75 (“First of all, the sheer number of asteroids—and the quantity of min-
erals contained within—limits potential disputes over claims of property. Most problems dur-
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Many of these ventures and the potential to do harm may become 
not only technologically feasible, but also economically feasible in the 
not too distant future.115 “The price of launch has decreased due to 
improved technology and increased competition.”116 The principal reason 
that space is not being developed “is the uncertainty of the legal 
regime.”117 Part II examines that regime and its impact on activities in 
outer space, like mining. 
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK—THE RULES OF THE ROAD 
“The utility of space, however, is limited to the extent that it can be 
accessed and used.”118 
There are two principal international treaties that apply to activities 
in outer space—the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities 
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty” or “OST”)119 and 
the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies (the “Moon Treaty”).120 There are other treaties of 
less significance for purposes of this Article, like treaties that govern 
liability for accidents in space121 and the rescue of astronauts.122 One 
hundred and two countries have adopted the OST, including the United 
 
ing the California Gold Rush arose because both real estate and minerals were limited. Sec-
ond, the expense of sending mining ventures to an asteroid is so prohibitive that only those 
companies that have the requisite funding will be able to enter the market. Finally, the amount 
of material any one project can ferry from an asteroid and back will necessarily be limited 
due to the size of spacecraft.”); see also Reinstein, supra note 1, at 61 (“Recent price estimates 
of launching material into orbit costs approximately $10,000 per pound; $25,000–30,000 per 
pound of material to launch to our moon. The tremendous cost of launch, retrieval, and return 
means that ‘if there was gold in low Earth orbit and all the shuttle had to do was go up and 
open its cargo bay doors and let [the gold] fall in, it would[ not] be worth it, even then.’”). 
115.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 60–61. 
116.  Id. at 61; see MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 651 (“One of the most significant obsta-
cles for the private space industry has been the price tag of traveling into space.”). 
117.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 61; see MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 651 (“Complicating 
matters, the current law governing claims of property in space is ambiguous.”). 
118.  Taylor, supra note 31, at 254. 
119.  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
120.  Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bod-
ies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Treaty]. 
121.  See Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 
opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Space 
Liability Treaty]. 
122.  See Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return 
of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 
672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue Treaty]. 
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States and the former Soviet Union; its broad acceptance “has given it the 
character of binding international law even on those countries who have 
not ratified it.”123 In contrast, only thirteen countries have adopted the 
Moon Treaty and, therefore, it is in effect only with respect to those 
countries.124 Neither treaty establishes a governance regime for outer 
space, and neither treaty resolves any of the property ownership 
questions, which motivated the writing of this Article.125 For example, 
while the OST clearly bars the appropriation of “celestial bodies” by 
countries, it does not address private entities appropriating them.126 
The origins of the OST are in General Assembly Resolution 1348 
(XIII) of December 13, 1958, one purpose of which was “to avoid the 
extension of present national rivalries into this new field.”127 Its roots are 
in the aftermath of the Cold War and a concomitant desire to avoid 
turning outer space into a war zone.128 “Concerns over space imperialism 
were the main impetus for the central provision of the OST: the principle 
of nonappropriation of space by Nation-States.”129 The non-militarist 
purpose of the Outer Space Treaty was very important to the United 
States.130 “Each side of the Cold War was hoping to prevent the other 
from advancing as a sovereign into outer space and achieving an 
insurmountable military and geographic superiority. As a result, the OST 
 
123.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 66. 
124.  Coffey, supra note 29, at 127. 
125.  See Wasser & Jobes, supra note 98, at 58–59. 
126.  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. II; see also MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 
660. 
127.  G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), at 5 (Dec. 13, 1958). 
128.  Brehm, supra note 1, at 357 (internal footnote omitted) (“Subsequent international 
negotiations concerning outer space, all taking place under the shadow of Cold War political 
and militaristic tensions, led to the drafting of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activi-
ties of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Ce-
lestial Bodies. The Outer Space Treaty, commonly referred to as the second ‘non-armament’ 
treaty, was signed on January 27, 1967.”); Id. at 371–72 (“The seminal treaty in this arena, 
the Outer Space Treaty, stems from the non-armament context of the Cold War and the global 
impact of potential militarization of outer space.”). 
129.  Elliott Reavan, Comment, The United States Commercial Space Launch Competitive-
ness Act: The Creation of Private Space Property Rights and the Omission of the Right to 
Freedom from Harmful Interference, 94 WASH. U.L. REV. 238, 243 (2016). 
130.  See U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1st Comm. at 8–10, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1492 (Dec. 17, 
1966), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/garecords/A_C1_PV1492E.pdf. (statement of U.S. Repre-
sentative, Arthur J. Goldberg, to the General Assembly) (“We of the United States regard this 
treaty as an important step toward peace. . . . Therefore, as we stand on the threshold of the 
[S]pace [A]ge, our first responsibility as governments is clear: we must make sure that man’s 
earthly conflicts will not be carried into outer space. . . . [The Outer Space Treaty] responds 
to that desire and hope.”); see also STAFF OF COMM. ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCI., 90TH 
CONG., TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE EXPLORATION 
AND USE OF OUTER SPACE, INCLUDING THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES 15 (Comm. 
Print 1967); Reinstein, supra note 1, at 62; Wasser & Jobes, supra note 98, at 42. 
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is at best ambiguous, and at worst hostile, to the privatization and 
commercialization of space resources.”131 
The Outer Space Treaty establishes the basic framework governing 
activities in outer space.132 It broadly 
declares that outer space is free for exploration and use by all states, that 
the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes, that outer space is not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, and that the exploration and use 
of outer space shall be carried of [sic] for the benefit and interest of all 
countries and shall be the province of all mankind.133 
By making it impossible for any country to control outer space, the treaty 
“addressed Cold War concerns about [countries] claiming space and 
celestial bodies as their own territory and using them to station weapons 
for use against other countries.”134 While the OST encourages “[t]he 
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial 
bodies,”135 it fails to confront today’s concerns about claiming resources 
from these entities.136 Its general principles, which were to be expanded 
upon in subsequent treaties, do not contain much guidance on the 
ownership of extraterrestrial property or resources.137 The drafters of the 
treaty “did not set out to create a comprehensive legal document to govern 
space for all eternity.”138 Thus, the OST is no more than “a diplomatic 
stopgap hurriedly prepared before the first landing on the moon could 
ignite a new theater of Cold War conflict.”139 The drafters clearly “did 
 
131.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 63. 
132.  Coffey, supra note 29, at 125. 
133.  Id. (citing Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, arts. I–II). 
134.  Id. 
135.  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. I. 
136.  Coffey, supra note 29, at 125; see also Reavan, supra note 129, at 244 (“Taken to-
gether, it is clear that the OST precludes any claim over territorial rights in space of any kind. 
What is less clear, however, is whether the appropriation of space resources is consistent with 
the OST, as the OST does not explicitly mention the extraction or ownership of space re-
sources.”). Coffey goes further, saying that “mining or owning natural resources is not one of 
the forbidden activities.” Coffey, supra 29, at 126. MacWhorter believes that while the United 
States could not extend its jurisdiction over the surface of a celestial body because this action 
would be barred by the OST, “[i]t could, however, unilaterally guarantee property rights in 
extracted minerals within its own borders.” MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 665. 
137.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 660–61. Arthur Goldberg, then head of the U.S. ne-
gotiating team on the Outer Space Treaty, in response to a question at the Senate ratification 
hearings about Article I, said that “the article [was] a ‘broad general declaration of purposes’ 
that would have no specific impact until its intent was detailed in subsequent, detailed agree-
ments.” John W. Finney, Space Treaty Called ‘Fuzzy’ at Senate Hearings: Rusk and Goldberg 
Dispute Unexpected Objections by Gore and Fulbright, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1967, at 20; see 
also Wasser & Jobes, supra note 98, at 42. 
138.  Johnson, supra note 75, at 1508. 
139.  Id. Johnson goes on to say that given the context in which the Treaty was drafted, its 
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not contemplate the rise of private space flight”140 and the ensuing push 
by private companies to engage in commercial activities in outer space.141 
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty establishes a principle of free use 
and open access by declaring that outer space and celestial bodies “shall 
be the province of all mankind”—specifically, that “exploration and use 
of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be 
carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries . . . and shall 
be the province of all mankind.”142 Article I “establishes the OST’s 
fundamental presumption that outer space is ‘free for exploration and 
use.’”143 The generally accepted interpretation of this language is an 
“affirmation of general principles of access” that “confirms the freedom 
of use because every state has an equal right to pursue space activities . . . 
rather than a prohibition of certain activities.”144 Therefore, a claim by 
any nation of exclusive jurisdiction over a part of outer space could 
infringe on the rights of other states to access that area.145 Article I 
“[e]ssentially . . . establishes a presumptive freedom of use, while the 
succeeding provisions qualify that freedom in a manner which advances 
the treaty’s peaceful purpose.”146 
Article II is one of those succeeding provisions that curtails “the 
freedom of use outlined in Article [I] by declaring that outer space, 
including the [m]oon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national 
appropriation.”147 It flatly prohibits national appropriation of any celestial 
body in outer space “by means of use or occupation, or by any other 
means.”148 However, “many types of ‘use’ or ‘exploitation’. . . are 
inconceivable without appropriation of some degree at least of any 
materials taken,” like ore or water.149 If this view of Article II’s 
prohibitory language is correct, then “it is not at all farfetched to say that 
 
authors “could not have intended a rule against private extraction of lunar minerals since Cold 
War-era technology was insufficiently developed to allow for such activities.” Id. He finds 
support for that conclusion in the number of Senate floor speeches regarding the Treaty’s 
ratification which made no mention of space mining. Id. at 1509. 
140.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 660. 
141.  Id. at 649. 
142.  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. I. 
143.  Johnson, supra note 75, at 1500 (quoting Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. I). 
144.  Johnson, supra note 75, at 1501. 
145.  Id.  
146.  Id. at 1486. “Ultimately, the drafters decided on the less intrusive principle, setting 
the tone for the rest of the treaty by establishing that the freedom to use space is a positive 
right that can only be defeated by a corresponding restriction found later in the treaty.” Id. at 
1504. 
147.  Id. at 1486 (citing Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. II). 
148.  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. II.  
149.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 69. 
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the OST actually installs a blanket prohibition on many beneficial forms 
of development.”150 However, the OST only prohibits an appropriation 
that constitutes a “long-term use and permanent occupation, to the 
exclusion of all others.”151 
Article VI of the OST “opens the door” for private exploration of 
outer space and celestial bodies152 by declaring that “States Parties to the 
Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in 
outer space, including the [m]oon and other celestial bodies, whether such 
activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-
governmental entities . . . .”153 Article VIII “confers jurisdictional control 
over the space objects and people engaged in outer space expeditions to 
the state party of the treaty on whose registry the object or person 
appears,” while Article IX enjoins parties engaged in activities in outer 
space to act with “due regard” to the interests of other countries in outer 
space and to not contaminate celestial bodies.154 Article X requires parties 
to the treaty to make space launches available for observation by other 
parties.155 “Articles XI and XII impose disclosure requirements, 
mandating that spacefarers must keep the public informed of their 
activities, and allow for other parties to visit outer space installations after 
appropriate notice.”156 
Ezra Reinstein calls the Outer Space Treaty’s view on property law 
“oddly conflicted.”157 “On the one hand, the OST seems to endorse some 
property rights in [outer] space” by paying at least “lip service to the 
‘exploration and use’ of outer space” in the Preamble and Article I,158 
while on the other, seems to deny these rights by declaring that these 
activities “shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all 
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific 
development, and shall be the province of all mankind.”159 He notes that 
there is “widespread disagreement regarding the force” of the phrase 
“province of all mankind.”160 Some hold that the language is only “a non-
binding guide, a moral exhortation.”161 Others see the language, together 
 
150.  Id.  
151.  Id. at 70. 
152.  Brehm, supra note 1, at 358. 
153.  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. VI. 
154.  Id. arts. VIII–IX. 
155.  Id. art. X. 
156.  DiMaria, supra note 28, at 420 (citing Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, arts. XI–
XII). 
157.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 66. 
158.  Id. 
159.  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. I; Reinstein, supra note 1, at 66. 
160.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 66–67. 
161.  Id. at 67. 
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with the Moon Treaty, “as requiring that a system be imposed whereby 
all development is undertaken by a unified international organization, 
with profits spread amongst all nations without regard to involvement.”162 
To those favoring development, interpreting Article I, in effect, to 
“mandate . . . wealth redistribution,” would be the end of developing 
outer space’s resources.163 Such an interpretation would require that an 
international institution would get to “determine what degree of wealth 
sharing is fair to ‘all countries.’”164 This would compel the entities that 
created and improved the technology for resource extraction as well as 
“the financial and physical risks that are part and parcel of the pioneering 
development of space . . . to defer to international political consensus.”165 
The purpose of the Outer Space Treaty was not to establish a detailed 
system of property rights; rather, it was to set out “a general set of 
peaceful principles.”166 The result is a treaty that “is riddled with 
ambiguities” and unanswered questions with respect to property rights.167 
It says nothing about what “rights parties can claim in celestial bodies” 
and under what circumstances “these unspecified property rights might 
vest.”168 These ambiguities, especially with respect to the rights of private 
enterprises in the resources they develop, can prohibit development of 
those resources, almost as much as a system that bans development 
completely.169 
The second major treaty governing activities in outer space is the 
Moon Treaty.170 “The treaty reiterates the OST’s designation of space as 
for the exploration and use of all nations. It places the right to explore and 
 
162.  Id. “[E]vidence indicates that the U.S. Senate, while debating whether to ratify the 
OST, also understood this phrase to require an equitable division of space-borne wealth 
among all nations.” Id. 
163.  Id. at 68. 
164.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 68. 
165.  Id. 
166.  Johnson, supra note 75, at 1500.  
 
 [I]t would be disingenuous to suggest that its text provides a clear statement on 
whether private actors may extract mineral resources from celestial bodies. The only 
safe conclusion is that the OST’s authority is not limited to states. Presumably, a state 
will act to ensure private actors are in compliance with the OST’s principles to avoid 
violating the treaty, lest it provoke other states to ignore the treaty. Therefore, further 
investigation is required to determine whether a private actor may enjoy the right to 
harvest extraterrestrial resources.  
 
 Id. at 1503. 
167.  Wasser, supra note 98, at 58–59. 
168.  In other words, “what a person must do to gain whatever property rights are availa-
ble.” Reinstein, supra note 1, at 71. 
169.  Id. 
170.  See Moon Treaty, supra note 120; Brehm, supra note 1, at 358. 
BABCOCK FINAL ARTICLE 6/20/2019  1:28 PM 
212 Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 69:191 
use the moon for scientific benefit above private property rights. Finally, 
it establishes the moon as ‘the common heritage of all mankind.’”171 
However, only thirteen countries have ratified the Moon Treaty; hence it 
is binding on only those countries, even though the treaty was extensively 
debated in many countries, including in the United States.172 Thus, 
despite its greater specificity, the treaty lacks the support necessary “to 
bind non-signatory states.”173 Sarah Coffey calls the Moon Treaty a 
“failed treaty” because no country with the capacity to send an expedition 
into space is bound by it; indeed all spacefaring nations and most of the 
rest of the international community rejected it.174 Nor will any theory of 
customary international law bind any country that has not ratified the 
treaty because “[t]here is insufficient state practice to claim that the 
common heritage doctrine as embodied in the Moon Treaty has become 
legal custom.”175 In fact, there are no practices yet in outer space that 
might qualify as a basis for legal custom for anything.176 
Article 1 of the Moon Treaty declares that its provisions “shall also 
apply to other celestial bodies within the solar system, other than the 
earth.”177 Article 6 encourages “freedom of scientific investigation” by 
authorizing countries to “collect on and remove from the moon samples 
of its mineral and other substances,” while Article 8 allows “exploration 
and use of the moon anywhere on or below its surface.”178 Article 6 
makes it clear that “such samples shall remain at the disposal of those 
States Parties which caused them to be collected and may be used by them 
for scientific purposes.”179 Article 8 additionally allows countries to land 
 
171.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 664 (citing Moon Treaty, supra note 120, arts. 4, 11). 
172.  Coffey, supra note 29, at 127 (“Although the Moon [Treaty] opened for signatures in 
1979, it did not enter into force until 1984 when it was ratified by a fifth country. It is currently 
binding only on the thirteen nations that have ratified it.”); see Johnson, supra note 75, at 
1497 (“Despite this result, the Moon Treaty has little practical impact on current space law. 
Though it entered into force, the treaty does not bind the spacefaring nations because it cannot 
regulate the behavior of non-parties without their consent.”). 
173.  Johnson, supra note 75, at 1494.  
174.  See Coffey, supra note 29, at 127 (“The Moon [Treaty] is, in effect, a failed treaty 
because no nation that has ever performed a manned space flight is bound by it.”).  
175.  Johnson, supra note 75, at 1497–98. However, “spacefaring nations not party to the 
Moon Treaty may be bound by its provisions if the provisions . . . become customary interna-
tional law.” Id. at 1497. “Nothing . . . precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming 
binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as such.” Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 38, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
176.  See Johnson, supra note 75, at 1498 (“As for space mining, neither states nor their 
private actors have attempted to harvest celestial resources, so there is no demonstrated prac-
tice by commission. Since technological hurdles prevent such an attempt at the present time, 
there is also no example of state practice by omission.”). 
177.  Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 1. 
178.  Id. arts. 6, 8. 
179.  Id. art. 6. 
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on the moon and launch space objects from it, and to “[p]lace their 
personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and installations 
anywhere on or below the surface of the moon.”180 The treaty also allows 
“[p]ersonnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and 
installations [to] move or be moved freely over or below the surface of 
the moon.”181 But those activities “shall not interfere with the activities 
of other States Parties on the moon.”182 Article 9 elaborates on Article 8, 
by authorizing states to “establish manned and unmanned stations on the 
moon,” but limiting this use to only an area necessary to meet the “needs 
of the station,” and not done in a way that might “impede the free 
access . . . of other States.”183 These provisions may allow the location of 
an unmanned space station on the moon’s surface because doing this does 
not amount to possession of the moon’s surface.184 
Article 11 declares that “the moon and its natural resources are the 
common heritage of mankind” and, among other things, prohibits 
“national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or 
occupation, or by any other means.”185 Article 11 extends the ban against 
physical appropriation of celestial bodies and their resources to non-
governmental entities, stating, in part, that “neither the surface nor the 
subsurface of the [m]oon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in 
place, shall become property of any State, international 
intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national 
organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural person.”186 
This provision was included in response to scientists who feared the 
possibility of competitive space settlements and wanted the moon 
reserved for research only.187 Article 11 also requires “States Parties to 
 
180.  Id. art. 8. 
181.  Id. 
182.  Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 8. 
183.  Id. art. 9; see also Buxton, supra note 2, at 702. 
184.  Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 9; Buxton, supra note 2, at 702. 
185.  Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 11 (emphasis added). “[T]he very fact that the 
framers of the Moon Treaty felt the need to write a new specific ban on private property 
indicates that they did not feel the earlier Outer Space Treaty had already accomplished such 
a prohibition.” Wasser & Jobes, supra note 98, at 43. 
186.  Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 11; see also Brehm, supra note 1, at 358–59. 
187.  Wasser & Jobes, supra note 98, at 47–48. Space activist Paul Beich wrote,  
 
 [C]apitalism is a disincentive for any activity that does not directly or indirectly result 
in the production of wealth for the elite. The profit motive is capitalism’s euphemism 
for greed, and greed is a poor motivation for anything, especially the noble and excit-
ing human endeavor of moving into the universe.  
 
 Paul Beich, Letters: Will Capitalism Work?, AD ASTRA, May/June 1998, at 3; Wasser & 
Jobes, supra note 98, at 48 n.45. This is an example of the view of private property as an 
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[the] Agreement . . . to establish an international regime . . . to govern the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the moon as such exploitation is 
about to become feasible.”188 But the absence of the United States and 
Russia, neither of whom has ratified the Treaty, and the limited number 
of signatories severely limits the provision’s “practical effect.”189 
The most controversial of the Treaty’s provisions is its “common 
heritage of mankind” principle,190 which is similar to language in the 
Outer Space Treaty that space is the “province of mankind.”191 Under 
Article 11’s common heritage of mankind principle, countries do not own 
land, but can manage resources in designated international zones.192 
Therefore, no individual country has sovereignty over these areas; 
international law, including international custom, “governs.”193 Although 
the common heritage of mankind principle is undefined, “subsequent 
clauses [in] Article 11 give substance to [that] provision”194 by, among 
other things, (1) establishing an international body for directing the use 
of outer space’s natural resources; (2) declaring that outer space “is not 
subject to national appropriation . . . by means of use or occupation, or 
by any other means”; (3) requiring the equitable apportionment of the 
benefits from exploitation of the moon, including by countries that do not 
have exploratory programs; and (4) requiring the rational management of 
the moon’s resources, thereby providing protection and preservation of 
these resources for the benefit of mankind.195 
Lacking a defined meaning, the phrase can only have limited effect. 
 
“abomination” and which “should be made illegal in the new world of space.” Wasser & 
Jobes, supra note 98, at 48; see also Henry R. Hertzfeld & Frans G. von der Dunk, Bringing 
Space Law into the Commercial World: Property Rights without Sovereignty, 6 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 81, 91 (2005) (“Corporations exist to make profits, and property rights only matter to the 
extent that they are necessary to fulfill the objective of maximizing profit. Popular literature 
and the statements of corporate executives gives the impression that unless companies can 
obtain ownership to space territory, they will not be able to invest in space activities profita-
bly. But in the reasonably near future, no company operating in space will likely need outright 
ownership of space territory, including land on the moon.”). 
188.  Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 11. 
189.  See Brehm, supra note 1, at 359. 
190.  See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 75, at 1483 (emphasis omitted) (“Much controversy 
over space law revolves around a third concept that expands upon res communis omnium—
the common heritage of mankind principle.”); Lynn M. Fountain, Note, Creating Momentum 
in Space: Ending the Paralysis Produced by the “Common Heritage of Mankind” Doctrine, 
35 CONN. L. REV. 1753, 1759–60 (2003) (arguing that the Common Heritage doctrine should 
not apply to outer space because it represents a classic “tragedy of the commons” problem 
and fails to efficiently allocate resources). 
191.  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. I. 
192.  See Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 11; Buxton, supra note 2, at 691–92. 
193.  See Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 11; Buxton, supra note 2, at 692. 
194.  Johnson, supra note 75, at 1496. 
195.  Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 11; Johnson, supra note 75, at 1496. 
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Nonetheless, it is highly controversial and subject to widely conflicting 
interpretations.196 Some argue that the phrase “vaguely” limits property 
rights; others go further and say it actually reserves resources “to 
common use in line with the Roman law principle of res communis.”197 
Brian Abrams assumes that the phrase ‘“province of mankind’ means 
ownership of mankind. Thus[,] the [United Nations] or other 
[intergovernmental organization] acts as the owner of outer space on 
behalf of all mankind.”198 Carol Buxton argues that “[t]he common 
heritage of mankind principle deals with international management of 
resources within a territory, rather than the territory itself.”199 And David 
Johnson criticizes the language because it “goes beyond the principle of 
a res communis in that even the ownership of movable resources in a 
common heritage area is forbidden without international consent.”200 
Non-spacefaring and less developed countries favor an 
interpretation that makes clear that “international areas designated for the 
common heritage of mankind do not belong to any one sovereign, but 
instead to all nations. Therefore, any resource or benefit derived from 
those resources, or the use of them, should serve all of mankind.”201 They 
consider the principle to create a “common property,” which should be 
under “common management,” with one group “possessing exclusive 
rights to exploit natural resources and distribute those resources equally 
to all nations, regardless of which nations actually funded the effort 
(either economically or by developing the technology or both).”202 
Buxton finds this interpretation “inherently unfair,” and its application 
unlikely to provide an incentive for spacefaring nations to undertake any 
expeditions to outer space.203 She argues additionally that this 
interpretation robs the principle of any incentive it might have had to 
encourage less-developed nations to acquire the know-how to participate 
in the Space Age or fund exploration by them or others.204 
“Developed nations interpret the principle as meaning that ‘anyone 
can exploit these natural resources so long as no single nation claims 
 
196.  See id. at 1483. 
197.  DiMaria, supra note 28, at 423. “[T]he United States and other spacefaring States 
opposed the agreement’s use of the res communis ‘common heritage of mankind’ principle, 
especially after that same principle caused [the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea] to fail.” Id. at 424. 
198.  Abrams, supra note 57, at 812 n.90.  
199.  Buxton, supra note 2, at 692 (emphasis added). 
200.  Johnson, supra note 75, at 1484 (emphasis omitted).  
201.  Buxton, supra note 2, at 692.  
202.  Id. (emphasis added). 
203.  See id. at 693. 
204.  Id.  
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exclusive jurisdiction’ over the area from which they are recovered.”205 
In other words, “every nation enjoys access and each nation must make 
the most of that access. The heritage lies in the access to the resources, 
not the technology or funding to exploit them.”206 They reason that since 
“they spend their time and money developing the technology that enables 
them to harvest resources, and they fund the expeditions that collect the 
resources, forcing them to share those benefits with countries that have 
contributed little or nothing to the effort would be unjust.”207 These 
countries do not want the principle included in any new treaties because 
it substantially reduces the economic incentive to develop “technology to 
exploit natural resources.”208 
Given the fact that so few countries have acceded to its terms and its 
operative principle is continually controverted, Coffey is right; the treaty 
is a failure.209 Kevin MacWhorter attributes this to the unwillingness of 
spacefaring countries to accept the treaty’s limitation on property 
ownership.210 He compares the Moon Treaty to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),211 which he says was 
accepted globally “because every nation with a coastline stood to gain 
from the extension of coastal jurisdiction,” and they, as well as their 
citizens, could “benefit from the possibility of unlimited mineral 
extraction.”212 This the Moon Treaty did not do.213 Nonetheless, together 
with the Outer Space Treaty, it provides the framework for handling 
property rights in outer space, and it is to that topic the Article now 
turns.214 
 
205.  Id. 
206.  Buxton, supra note 2, at 693. 
207.  Id. 
208.  Id. (finding this position “all too clear for capitalistic societies”). 
209.  See Coffey, supra note 29, at 127. 
210.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 671. 
211.  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
212.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 671. “The practical difficulties of traveling to space 
and carting minerals back to Earth is self-limiting enough to prevent any one company from 
obtaining more than its fair share.” Id. But see Reinstein, supra note 1, at 79–80 (criticizing 
UNCLOS and its requirements “regarding [the] mining of Earth’s deep seabed”). “The 
[UNC]LOS establishes an ‘Authority’ and an ‘Enterprise.’ Mining companies must receive 
approval from the Authority. Approval . . . is only granted if the applicant company satisfies 
a set of rigorous conditions.” Id. (internal footnotes omitted). Under the first condition, “[t]he 
applicant must present two sites of equal value, one of which will be reserved by the Authority 
for development by the Enterprise.” Id. “If space law follows the [UNC]LOS’s lead and asks 
developed nations to make similarly-excessive sacrifices for the benefit of developing nations, 
the same political impasse with the resultant disparate and incoherent legal regimes will no 
doubt reoccur.” Id. Although Reinstein disapproves of this proposal, it is none the less inter-
esting. See id. at 79–80. 
213.  See MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 671. 
214.  See id. at 657–58. 
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III. PROPERTY IN OUTER SPACE 
“Space law must take into account private needs and build on private 
opportunities; to do this, it must embrace the principle of private prop-
erty.”215 
In our legal system, there are three types of property ownership—
private, public, and communal.216 Private property usually involves a 
single owner, either “a legal person like a corporation” or “a natural 
person.”217 Public property, on the other hand, is owned by the state or its 
agents, while “common property” usually involves at least two entities 
who “hold the property in question either as joint tenants or as tenants in 
common.”218 If neither of these situations is involved, the property may 
be “characterized as null property, open-to-entry property, or res nullius, 
and the resources covered by these arrangements are open to use by one 
and all without restrictions.”219 
The debate over the property ownership provisions of the OST and 
the Moon Treaty is between private and common ownership with 
commercial interests favoring the first, and those concerned with assuring 
the sustainability of outer space resources and equitable access to them 
favoring ownership in common.220 This Part explores these two types of 
ownership in the context of outer space,221 identifying their benefits and 
flaws before concluding that considering outer space as common property 
owned by the citizens of the globe is more closely aligned with over-
arching international principles of how space should be managed.222 
At its heart, the debate about property type is about rights in that 
property. Property rights, like any other right, are “social artifacts.”223 
They are neither fixed nor assumed, and may “vary from one society to 
another and over time within the same society.”224 They consist of 
 
215.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 98. 
216.  See Oran R. Young, Rights, Rules, and Common Pools: Solving Problems Arising in 
Human/Environment Relations, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 6 (2007). 
217.  Id. 
218.  Id. 
219.  Id. 
220.  See id. at 12–13. 
221.  This Article does not address public ownership because of the clear ban under inter-
national law on nations owning property on celestial boundaries, as discussed in Part II. Fur-
ther, it would be very difficult and contentious to determine which nations own which celestial 
body, like the moon or parts of it. 
222.  “[P]roperty law has an important role in addressing widespread economic inequality 
by protecting those goods most essential to the well-being of a broad swath of society, rather 
than just protecting the goods that are disproportionately held by the wealthy.” Sheila R. Fos-
ter & Christian Iaione, The City as Commons, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 285 (2016). 
223.  Young, supra note 216, at 5. 
224.  Id. 
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“bundles of rights that can be and often are separated or combined in 
complex ways.”225 Some forms of property management, like custodial 
or stewardship management, allow for disaggregating those bundles.226 
At a minimum, these bundles include possessory rights or the 
entitlements of ownership per se, usufructuary rights or rights to make 
use of property in specified ways, exclusion rights or rights to prevent 
others from using property without permission, and disposition rights 
or rights to dispose of property according to the wishes of the owner.227 
Some of these rights, such as exclusion rights, the right to prevent access 
to or use of the property, and disposition or alienation of the property, 
may be problematic in outer space under international law, as discussed 
in Part IV.228 
Possessory rights, a stick in the property rights bundle, can be 
“subdivided.”229 Some of the ways this can be done are discussed in Part 
VI and are worth considering in the context of outer space.230 “[E]ven 
relatively full bundles of rights are not unlimited or unrestricted.”231 
Imagining property regimes of less than full and unimpeded ownership 
in outer space is conceivable, as is altering the structure of property rights 
to eliminate or lessen perverse incentives, like competition, from the 
implementation of those rights.232 
For private property rights to emerge out of a common property 
regime or from null property where there is no ownership, like outer 
space, “cost-effective technologies for measuring, monitoring, and 
 
225.  Id. at 6. 
226.  See discussion infra Part IV (discussing stewardship as a means of managing property 
without owning the property); see also Martin Hirschprung, Ownership is Nine-Tenths of Pos-
session: How Disparate Concepts of Ownership Influence Possession Doctrines, 41 VT. L. 
REV. 143, 149 (2016) (internal footnote omitted) (“[T]he stewardship model [of property man-
agement] facilitates an understanding of resource protection that extends beyond the tradi-
tional ownership model and embodies a notion of mutual trusteeship. It also allows for a dis-
aggregation of title, possession, and exclusion.”). 
227.  Young, supra note 216, at 6. 
228.  See discussion supra Part IV. 
229.  Young, supra note 216, at 6 (“Possessory rights can be subdivided as in cases where 
owners sell or give away development rights while retaining the rest of the bundle of entitle-
ments, or where different parties share such rights as in systems of common field agriculture 
in which one party is entitled to grow crops on the land, while others have rights to graze 
cattle on the same land once the crops have been harvested.”). 
230.  See discussion infra Part VI. 
231.  Young, supra note 216, at 6. 
232.  Id. at 8 (“[P]lans for solving a wide range of problems relating to the environment 
and natural resources commonly take the form of proposals for altering prevailing structures 
of property rights in order to eliminate perverse incentives by creating exclusion mechanisms 
or, less often, by encouraging efforts to increase the supply of goods in order to alleviate 
conditions of rivalness.”). 
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enclosing private property must emerge” to enable the claiming and 
transferring of “identifiable units of the resource.”233 If there is no private 
rights technology or “the distributional cost hurdle is too high, private 
property rights cannot emerge because the transaction cost wedge is 
simply too large.”234 Instead, “political or regulatory property rights will 
emerge.”235 While property rights are continually created and abandoned, 
depending on economic conditions, the act of defining property “has a 
high fixed cost element,” such as the cost of establishing and defending 
boundaries, which can have an effect on the emergence of property 
rights.236 
One of the problems facing the creation of private property rights in 
outer space is the emergence of technology to define those rights in an 
area that is without static geographic and political boundaries.237 Another 
problem is how to grant, let alone enforce, those rights without violating 
international space law that bans the appropriation of outer space and its 
resources. So, the presence of potential entrepreneurs eager for the 
development of that technology, like Bruce Yandle and Andrew 
Morriss’s cattlemen of yore and the development of barbed wire, may not 
 
233.  Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice 
Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 131 
(2001).  
 
 According to this model, the process begins when the common-access resource is 
made more valuable by growing demand. As demand increases, the potential profits 
from defining private property rights bring the common access resource to the thresh-
old at which it is worth incurring the transaction costs necessary to define rights. 
 
 Id. For property rights to emerge from a commons, any wealth distribution effects must also 
be “successfully resolved.” Id.   
234.  Id. (applying this lesson to the advent of barbed wire, the ability to record and enforce 
land ownership, and alienate ownership in the West). 
235.  Id.  
236.  Yandle & Morriss, supra note 233, at 135. These costs include defining the bounda-
ries of each tract, development of the means to defend each tract, ranging from fences to 
trespass lawsuits, and market protection from force of fraud. Id. at 136. These same types of 
cost exist if common land is to be converted to public property like a park, but here there must 
be enforceable rule for the park’s use if the land is to be made “regulatory property,” governed 
by permits then the terms of the permits must be stated and defended. Id.  
237.  See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 95 (“[A] right of ownership over space itself, for sev-
eral reasons, the most basic and fatal of which is that there would be no way to define static 
boundaries.”); cf. Zachary C.M. Arnold, Note, Against the Tide: Connecticut Oystering, Hy-
brid Property, and the Survival of the Commons, Note, 124 YALE L.J. 1206, 1231 (2015) 
(“[A]s cultivators pushed further out into the Sound, where town jurisdiction was uncertain 
and state regulation nonexistent, disputes seemed sure to multiply.”). Various proposals for 
establishing boundaries in the GSO, whether based on extending terrestrial property rights 
extending upward from a “negotiated floor” or assigning rights based on gravitation force, 
have no application to outer space. See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 96–97; see also Buxton, 
supra note 2, at 704–05 (explaining the so-called Bogota Declaration gravitational force). 
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stimulate its production because its application would conflict with 
international prohibitions.238 
Robert Ellickson suggests that “bottom-up, somewhat ad hoc 
property systems can [emerge and] reproduce most or all of the benefits 
of formal property law with a minimum of economic investment, 
procedure, and social disruption.”239 “Informal governance, like formal 
regulation, can ‘privatize’ [CPRs]”; Zachery Arnold points to “the 
‘lobster gangs’ chronicled by James Acheson” as a “classic example of 
informal privatization.”240 Elinor Ostrom writes about how communities 
under the right “sociopolitical conditions” can protect valuable CPRs 
from over-consumption or damage.241 But, none of these approaches 
appears appropriate for circumstances in outer space where small groups 
are unlikely to form around CPRs or where communication among 
entities will be intermittent at best, making any sharing of informal 
management approaches unlikely.242 With this as background, the Article 
 
238.  See Yandle & Morriss, supra note 233, at 131–32.  
 
 Without the potential customers for a new rights technology offered by private prop-
erty, entrepreneurs will not invest in creating such technologies. Just as the demand 
for a means to exclude others created the incentive for the invention of barbed wire, 
so opportunities for entrepreneurs would stimulate the production of new technologies 
to provide environmental goods. The regulatory property path forecloses such devel-
opments, however, by eliminating the opportunity to profit from developing such 
technologies.  
 
 Id. at 142–43. 
239.  Arnold, supra note 237, at 1214. 
240.  Arnold, supra note 237, at 1215; see James M. Acheson, The Lobster Fiefs Revisited: 
Economic and Ecological Effects of Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Industry, in THE 
QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL RESOURCES 37–65 
(Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987) (discussing, among other things, why 
private property has not emerged in the Maine lobster fishing industry and how Hardin’s trag-
edy of the commons is avoided). 
241.  Arnold, supra note 237, at 1215 (“Elinor Ostrom has enumerated sociopolitical con-
ditions under which communities can effectively protect and sustain valuable resources while 
maintaining such open systems. She argues that the community enjoying access to the com-
mons must be, among other traits, well-defined and self-governed, so that it is able to define 
rights, exclude outsiders, and monitor and discipline insiders as needed.”); see Elinor Ostrom, 
Institutional Arrangements for Resolving the Commons Dilemma: Some Contending Ap-
proaches, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra note 240, at 250–65 (using two case 
studies to examine the validity of theoretical statements about the commons); see also 
Pammela Quinn Saunders, A Sea Change off the Coast of Maine: Common Pool Resources 
as Cultural Property, 60 EMORY L.J. 1323, 1369 (2011) (“[R]esearch by social scientists con-
cludes that, under the right conditions, groups can cooperate and self-regulate to sustainably 
manage CPRs under their control.”). 
242.  See Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 323–25. The authors point out that “Ostrom’s 
study focused on small-scale resources affecting a relatively small number of persons ([50] to 
15,000) who are heavily dependent on the resource for economic returns.” Id. at 324 n.174. 
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describes what space might look like under the two basic property 
regimes—private ownership and ownership in common. 
A. Space Under a Traditional Private Property Regime 
Private property is the cornerstone of American ideals and “a 
foundation of the Constitution as well as its philosophical precepts.”243 
Indeed, “private property—and individual ownership specifically—runs 
throughout the DNA of this Nation.”244 Private property is often 
considered a driver of our economy because it creates incentives for 
investments in new technology and resource development, both of which 
are in play in the development of outer space.245 Property ownership can 
also encourage people to care about their property, protect adjacent land 
owners from the external effects of activities undertaken on their 
property, and assure its sustainability for future generations.246 Self-
interest can motivate a property owner to preserve their property to attract 
future buyers.247 To Richard Posner, the value of possession lies in its 
“economic efficiency” because it “tends to allocate resources to those 
 
This raises questions as to its relevance to this Article. 
243.  M. Alexander Pearl, The Tragedy of the Vital Commons, 45 ENVTL. L. 1021, 1058 
(2015). Pearl adds that “this is not necessarily a good thing.” Id. An important insight Pearl 
attributes to Carol Rose based on Johnson v. M’Intosh, is that “[i]t seems that individual own-
ership of property was engrained early in American legal thought and consciousness.” Id. at 
1033.  
244.  Pearl, supra note 243, at 1060; see also Saunders, supra note 241 (“Furthermore, 
CPRs can sometimes be the most effective form of resource management. This conclusion 
stands in contrast to the traditional assumption, which still permeates U.S. property law, that 
resources can be managed only by private ownership or central governmental control.”). 
245.  See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 74–75 (“So, ideally, celestial bodies should be put to 
the uses most beneficial to humanity. This is guaranteed by a system that puts land in the 
hands of those for whom the territory is most profitable.”); see also Hanoch Dagan, Why Mar-
kets? Welfare, Autonomy, and the Just Society, 117 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (man-
uscript at 15) (on file with author) (“[B]y allowing people to secure a temporally extended 
control of things, property facilitates our ability to carry out (on our own or with the cooper-
ation of others) meaningful projects and pursue comprehensive goals which require a tem-
poral horizon of action.”). 
246.  See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 78 (“[O]wnership . . . protects the interests of others: 
both those nearby (who instantly feel the effects of more care given to, e.g., waste disposal 
and water management), and those who come later.”); see also Coffey, supra note 29, at 140 
(“[A]llowing ownership of real property on celestial bodies would reduce wasteful use of the 
land. . . . If the expeditions owned the land, however, they would have incentive to use it 
efficiently and carefully consider all of its possible uses to maximize the investment.”); Pearl, 
supra note 243, at 1035 (“Express in Heller’s conclusion is the idea that property should work 
toward public goals. Another way of phrasing this is that private property should externalize 
some benefits to the public.”). 
247.  See Coffey, supra note 29, at 140 (“Even if the [outer space] expedition did not extract 
all the possible resources, an owner of celestial property would have an incentive to preserve 
as much as possible to make it attractive to a future buyer when the expedition sells the land.”). 
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persons best able to use them productively, for they are the people most 
likely to be willing to incur the costs involved in possession.”248 
Possession of property puts the rest of the world on notice of that 
possession.249 While possession is most commonly understood as 
physically holding onto an object, a more modern view sees it as a “form 
of control.”250 
But, private property can also “enhance income disparity, 
exacerbate[] economic tensions among individuals, and consolidate[] 
power among the one percent.”251 M. Alexander Pearl calls property 
privatization “a black hole focused solely on centralization of power and 
economic wealth without regard to the sustainability of an essential 
resource or the communities that depend upon its continued existence.”252 
Hanoch Dagan goes further, quoting Eric Posner and Glen Weyl, by 
saying, 
The key remedy for this predicament is to eradicate the institution of 
private ownership. Since “private ownership of any asset, except 
homogenous commodities, may hamper allocative efficiency,” we need 
to reconstruct markets so they are “competitive by design.” More 
precisely, we must discard private property and adopt in its stead a 
regime that partly transfers property’s “two most important ‘sticks’”—
the right to use and the right to exclude—”from the possessor to the 
public at large.”253 
When the value of a resource is increasing, it is more likely to be 
privatized so that the entity responsible for developing it can “fully 
capture the resulting benefits.”254 Indeed, a movement from common to 
private property occurs when the efficiency gains from private property 
are more than the costs of creating and maintaining it, such as “the basic 
costs of exclusion (fences, guards, and so on) and the extra vigilance 
 
248.  Hirschprung, supra note 226, at 147. 
249.  Id. (“Carol Rose opines that possession forms the basis of property ownership because 
of the value of communication through possession. Essentially, possession is notice of an 
individual’s ownership to the rest of the world.”).  
250.  Id. (“A working legal definition must necessarily expand beyond the physical holding 
of an object; any definition of possession must trace itself back to that root, possession as a 
form of control.”). In differentiating between possession and ownership, “possession was re-
garded as physical control[,] whereas ownership was regarded as the ultimate right, the title 
to property.” Id. at 153. 
251.  Pearl, supra note 243, at 1059. 
252.  Id. 
253.  Dagan, supra note 245, at 7. Dagan further states that Posner and Weyl’s property 
proposal is “designed to fix existing markets by supplanting private property with a regime in 
which people can only be ‘lessees from society,’ whose ‘lease terminates when a higher‐value 
user appears, whereupon the lease is automatically transferred to that user.’” Dagan, supra 
note 245, at 4. 
254.  Arnold, supra note 237, at 1212. 
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needed to deter interlopers from absconding with rising-value 
resources.”255 This balancing of costs and benefits may be irrelevant in 
outer space, as the costs of establishing private property in the first place 
would be huge, and the complexity and cost of technological innovations 
called for in outer space would be magnitudes greater than what is 
required on Earth.256 
 1. The Positive and Negative Features of Private Property 
Many believe that transporting the concept of private property to 
space should cause no concern; in fact, they view it positively.257 “By 
guaranteeing rights in extracted minerals taken from space, private 
industry could usher all of humanity into a new technological era.”258 
Among the advantages of private property ownership in space is the 
“reduc[tion] of wasteful use” and the right to transfer alienability to 
others, which “would compensate for positive externalities, thereby 
creating added incentive to productively develop space.”259 Private 
property would also enable colonization of celestial bodies like the 
moon.260 
In the absence of private ownership, there is the possibility that 
“each individual developer will seek to maximize his or her own gain by 
extracting as much value as quickly as possible without regard to the 
effect on the communal resource.”261 The President’s Commission on 
 
255.  Id.  
256.  Reinstein, supra 1, at 60–61. But see Young, supra note 216, at 4 (“[T]he introduction 
of new technologies or new social institutions can transform a non-excludable good into an 
excludable good at reasonable cost.”). However, none of the technological innovation exam-
ples that Young gives, like time slots governing the use of swimming pools and tennis courts, 
even advanced broadcasting methods, which have reduced competition for geomagnetic spec-
trum slots, are comparable to what would be required in outer space in scope and scale. See 
id. at 4. 
257.  See, e.g., MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 676; Young, supra note 216, at 98. 
258.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 676. 
259.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 75; see also Saunders, supra note 241, at 1335 (“Lobster-
men in these communities have ‘few if any other ways to make a living on these islands.’ 
Accordingly, they have always been and continue to be highly motivated ‘to preserve these 
resources for themselves’ in order ‘to make a living, and for future generations, if the com-
munity [is] to survive.’”). 
260.  See Reinstein, supra note 241, at 76.   
261.  Id. at 78; see, e.g., Brehm, supra note 1, at 359–60 (internal footnotes omitted) (“Greg 
Nemitz brought suit against NASA seeking declaratory judgment concerning alleged property 
rights in the asteroid Eros. Nemitz officially published a claim of ownership to Asteroid 433, 
Eros. Eleven months later, NASA’s NEAR Shoemaker spacecraft landed on Eros. Nemitz 
sent NASA a twenty-dollar invoice for parking and storage fees. NASA refused to pay and 
Nemitz brought suit. Nemitz’s action was dismissed, however, for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. The court found that Nemitz had failed to establish a legally 
recognizable property interest in Eros.”). 
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Implementation of U.S. Space Exploration Policy found that although the 
idea of private property in space is complicated because of national and 
international legal issues, it was imperative that they be addressed early 
in the process, “otherwise there will be little significant private sector 
activity associated with the development of space resources, one of our 
key goals.”262 
For those who seek development of space resources, “a reliable 
property rights regime will remove impediments to business activities on 
these bodies and inspire the commercial confidence necessary to attract 
the enormous investments needed for tourism, settlement, construction, 
and business development, and for the extraction and utilization of 
resources.”263 The resources supporting private space mining companies 
are essentially worthless if the companies have no legal right to the 
resources they have mined.264 “Without the legal right to use water and 
hydrogen mined from celestial bodies, and to alienate platinum group 
elements, the potential profitability of private space expeditions collapses 
along with the goals of deeper space exploration and settlement.”265 The 
lack of a stable private property regime in outer space also means that 
space settlements will not be able “to claim sufficient land to yield 
enough of the only ‘product’ the settlement can sell profitably enough to 
guarantee its survival.”266 The strong belief is that unless private property 
rights in outer space and its resources are recognized, commercial 
enterprises will be unable to sustain any type of successful commercial 
 
262.  REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. SPACE 
EXPLORATION POLICY: A JOURNEY TO INSPIRE, INNOVATE, AND DISCOVER 34 (2004), 
https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/60736main_M2M_report_small.pdf; see also Wasser & Jobes, su-
pra note 98, at 71–72. 
263.  Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From Earth to the 
Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 23, 27 (2005); see also Brehm, supra note 1, at 379 (“Private property 
rights in outer space are the foundation for the future of space exploration.”); Coffey, supra 
note 29, at 147 (“A stable legal framework will encourage progress by assuring expeditions 
that they will legally own the resources they extract.”). 
264.  Brehm, supra note 1, at 355. 
265.  Id.  
 
 Without the United States or other national governments recognizing property inter-
ests in outer space and celestial bodies, individuals and private entities lack the ability 
to sustain successful commercial outer space material extraction enterprises. Addi-
tionally, this concern is compounded by the position some commentators on space 
law hold, that if a nation were to recognize such property rights, recognition ‘would 
constitute a de facto exclusion of other states and their nationals, and thereby consti-
tute a form of national appropriation.’ Accordingly, this national appropriation would 
violate Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.  
 
 Id. at 360. 
266.  Wasser & Jobes, supra note 98, at 68. 
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activities in outer space.267 
The absence of “‘security derived from ownership and sovereign 
control, [means that] entities that might be interested in the development 
of space resources will be reluctant to undertake [the] expensive and risky 
path’ implicit in all space travel”268 without some return on their 
investment.269 In all likelihood, such a return would be “in the form of the 
right to exploit limited areas of space and in proceeds from the sale of 
space resources.”270 This uncertainty arguably leaves a large “legal void, 
a wasteland of indeterminacy and instability.”271 According to Reinstein, 
“Unless people and nations are encouraged to exploit the riches of space, 
humanity will never know their benefit. And the more we are able to 
exploit, the more humanity stands to benefit. If commercialization is to 
be successful, space law must encourage investment in outer space 
development.”272 
But, recognition of private property claims by the United States or 
by any other country could violate Article II of the OST’s prohibition 
against the national appropriation of space resources, including the 
surface of celestial objects.273 “[E]ven well-crafted domestic legislation 
that carefully addresses international law issues would create a significant 
risk of frustrating the explicit terms of the Outer Space Treaty, the intent 
and purpose of the treaty, or both.”274 No nation, including the United 
 
267.  See Brehm, supra note 1, at 360 (“[T]his concern is compounded by the position some 
commentators on space law hold, that if a nation were to recognize such property rights, 
recognition ‘would constitute a de facto exclusion of other states and their nationals, and 
thereby constitute a form of national appropriation.’ Accordingly, this national appropriation 
would violate Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.”). 
268.  Widgerow, supra note 22, at 492.  
269.  Id. at 519.  
270.  Id. “It is necessary to cater to these businesses because competition and individual 
ingenuity lead to advancement in ideas and technology, and because . . . state-run space pro-
grams are beset by limited budgets, taxpayer reticence, and shifting political attitudes.” Id. 
271.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 72.  
272.  Id.  
273.  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. II; Brehm, supra note 1, at 362; see also 
MacWhorter supra note 42, at 661 (“A majority of scholars agree that real property ownership 
in space is illegal, or at the very least unenforceable. The OST, however, only bars claims of 
“celestial bodies,” but not extracted materials.”). 
274.  Brehm, supra note 1, at 365.  
 
 In this regard, if the United States is to hold true to the overarching goal of promoting 
‘the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer 
space for peaceful purposes,’ domestic legislation would be insufficient as the sole 
means of establishing a private property regime in outer space and may be discarded 
as a problematic approach.  
 
 Id. 
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States, can independently alter the current international legal framework 
governing activities in outer space.275 And amending the OST to strike 
the language is unlikely, since the ban against appropriation of property 
in outer space is a “fundamental tenet of the treaty.”276 
Coffey believes that  
full ownership rights further [violate] the OST by disregarding the 
concerns of developing nations. If lunar real estate were put on the 
market, only the wealthy, developed nations and their citizens would be 
able to purchase it. If developing nations tried to purchase land later 
when they could afford it, they would be at a disadvantage because the 
prime locations are likely to be taken and the land’s current owners 
could demand whatever price they wanted. This could perpetuate 
current disparities of wealth and resources on Earth to the [m]oon and 
outer space.277 
This would be in violation of the Treaty’s intent as expressed in Article I 
that outer space and its resources shall be the “province of all 
mankind.”278 Ownership of space real estate could also lead to speculative 
purchases, the goal being not to develop the property, but to hold it until 
market conditions are more favorable, and then sell it for a large profit—
again, leading to the exclusion of poorer nations from the market.279 In 
all likelihood, the international community would react unfavorably to “a 
private property regime in outer space” because it would be perceived as 
benefiting large space-faring nations, like the United States and Russia, 
“at the expense of nations that do not have such capabilities.”280 But 
restricting ownership to anything less than fee simple absolute, like a 
lease or a license,281 means that the rights-holder could not alienate their 
property in any way, which decreases any significant incentive to acquire 
the right in the first place.282 
 
275.  See id. at 374 (“[I]t is not the prerogative of the U.S. government, or any government, 
to implement unilateral legislation that would significantly alter outer space and the current 
space law framework. It would frustrate the common conception of outer space as a free and 
open place, as well as the current legal framework, to simply enact domestic legislation that 
allows for the acquisition of private property rights in outer space.”). However, Brehm notes 
that “the Outer Space Treaty is silent on the issue of commercial extraction of resources.” Id. 
at 373. 
276.  Coffey, supra note 29, at 141. Coffey believes that an amendment is “unthinkable,” 
certainly before expeditions to the moon happen. Id. 
277.  Id.  
278.  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. I.; Coffey, supra note 29, at 125–26. 
279.  See Coffey, supra note 29, at 141–42.  
280.  Brehm, supra note 1, at 372. Brehm added that “it would be no easy task to gain 
international support for an agreement to establish a system of private property rights in outer 
space without aggravating numerous non-spacefaring nations.” Id. 
281.  Abrams, supra note 57, at 811–12. 
282.  See id. at 812 (“Granting inalienable territory would likely decrease the incentive of 
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 2. The Rule of First Possession 
The “most extreme proposal” with respect to implementing a 
property regime in outer space is to apply “first possession rules.”283 
Under these rules, a country could claim territory it discovered, and then 
decide whether “to open up settlement in its new territory to its own 
citizens or to the international community as a whole.”284 Within its own 
territory, the discovering nation’s sovereignty “would extend to its outer 
space territory, where it could govern as it pleased.”285 Such an approach 
would directly conflict with international space law forbidding countries 
from appropriating outer space or its resources.286 MacWhorter also 
worries that a first possession rule in space could devolve into “a space 
race and colonialism in a situation that requires limitation and prudence,” 
and would be difficult to sell to other nations, especially non-space faring 
ones.287 If the rules were applied to commercial enterprises, without a 
“centralized mechanism for demarcating the property”288—such as a 
sovereign289—the inevitable result would be disputes among putative 
property owners, like what happened in the West during the 
homesteading era.290 Reinstein agrees: “If the rule of ownership was no 
more than ‘first come, first served,’ with ownership going to the first 
person to grab a celestial body, an unmitigated land-rush would ensue.”291 
 
private entities to purchase it from an IGO. The more sticks in the bundle of property rights 
one receives, the more likely one is to buy.”).  
283.  Id. at 810–11 (“Perhaps the most extreme proposal is to open up outer space following 
first possession rules. This proposal treats celestial bodies as real property and allocates prop-
erty rights along a ‘first in time, first in right’ rule similar to homesteading in the nineteenth 
century United States.”); see also Hirschprung, supra note 226, at 162 (“First possession rules 
are common to a variety of legal schemes across the broadest range of cultures, including 
Native American, African, Civil, and Islamic law.”).  
284.  Abrams, supra note 57, at 811. 
285.  Id. 
286.  See MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 667–68. 
287.  See id. at 670. 
288.  Abrams, supra note 57, at 810–11. 
289.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 670 (“First possession works well in the context of 
Earth, because a sovereign has claim to the property first. In all of the author’s examples, 
including Johnson v. M’Intosh, homesteading, and the General Mining Statute of 1872, pri-
vate individuals came into possession of property after a sovereign—through principles of 
law—granted those claims. They can protect private claims, because the property is within 
the umbrella of the sovereign.”). 
290.  See Abrams, supra note 57, at 810–11. 
291.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 84–85; see also Reavan, supra note 129, at 257 (“Many 
still question the wisdom of a U.S. law creating commercial property rights. Some commen-
tators suggest that the impact of passing the [U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness 
Act of 2015 (USCSLC)] will not be on international law, but rather on international politics. 
It is also reasonable to suggest that the USCSLC could trigger mirroring legislation in other 
space-faring nations, which could create heated competition, controversy, and possibly 
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But MacWhorter also believes that limited property rights under a first 
possession rule might be an “appropriate first step,” if, for example, the 
property claim extended no further than to the claimed materials brought 
back to Earth.292 
Those who are concerned that less technically adept nations would 
be severely disadvantaged by a property rights regime that is premised 
“on the ‘right of [first] grab,’ the first-come, first-served theory of 
property acquisition,” oppose such an approach.293 “By the time space-
incapable nations develop the technological prowess and capital reserves 
to fund meaningful development of outer space, the earlier space-faring 
nations [and their citizens], left unchecked, might already have locked up 
the most accessible and valuable resources.”294 This would carry forward 
current disparities in global wealth distribution into the “Space Age.”295 
The argument against a right of first possession gains salience from 
the fact that prior wrongs inflicted on less developed countries may be 
the reason they are not “space-capable.”296 This inequitable situation 
would persist, as those who profit from private property rules like the 
right of first possession will have the political ties, money, and 
understanding of the “rules of the game” to prevent their reform.297 An 
additional problem with the proposal is its enforceability. The fact that 
outer space is infinite makes it more difficult to “police” and to enforce 
 
chaos.”); cf. Abrams, supra note 57 (“It is conceivable that in the future human behavior be-
yond Earth’s boundaries will more closely resemble the extent and nature of human activity 
on Earth.”). Reinstein adds that since the amount of wealth a claimant might receive depends 
on their being first in time, the result will be “the criminality and outright sabotage witnessed 
in the American West of the gold rush era.” Reinstein, supra note 1, at 84–85. 
292.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 670. 
293.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 64. 
294.  Id. 
295.  Id. at 64–65; see also Arnold, supra note 237, at 1213 (“The key for understanding . . . 
variation in property rights institutions is recognizing that the property rights that are devised 
to reduce the wastes of the common pool simultaneously define a distribution of wealth and 
political power.”). Later in his article, Reinstein notes that “[i]n the absence of prior existing 
property rights, . . . there seems to be nothing inherently immoral about a right of grab.” Re-
instein, supra note 1, at 79. But, a right of grab still “may severely disadvantage the lower-
tech nations in [the] future.” Id. 
296.  Reinstein, supra note 1, at 79 (“The perpetuation of past wrongs thus makes the right 
of grab doubly objectionable in the eyes of developing nations.”). Reinstein provides two 
answers to this issue: “First, the universe, for practical purposes, is not finite. Whenever de-
veloping nations become space-capable, there will be plenty of available unused space real 
estate. Second, corporations based in space-incapable nations could, of course, contract out 
to a space launch company from a space-capable nation.” Id.  
297.  Arnold, supra note 237 (“Current owners of resources are also more likely to have 
developed strategic political ties and an understanding of the ‘rules of the game’ that will aid 
them in lobbying against reform.”). 
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the various treaties that apply to it.298 In outer space, “a breaching private 
party could pursue its interests outside the scope of such an agreement 
with relative impunity before it was discovered by the relevant 
international authority.”299 
 3. Less than Fee Ownership 
There are less than fee ownership property regimes that can give the 
holder of a defeasible fee all the rights of an owner with complete title to 
the property, except the right to alienate it.300 Thus, “leaseholds, licenses, 
reversionary interest, easements, and covenants” might work well in 
outer space without violating international laws.301 There are also three 
types of defeasible fees that might be useful in outer space.302 “Defeasible 
fees, unlike fee simple absolute,” might convey property to a company, 
but are encumbered by an “automatic reversion or right of entry 
interest.”303 The first of these is a “fee simple subject to condition 
subsequent.”304 These conditions, “if triggered, would revert the realty 
back into the control of the multinational community.”305 So to the extent 
space resources have been appropriated, the withdrawal is not 
permanent.306 
Then there is a “fee simple determinable,” which is like a fee simple 
subject to condition subsequent, “except that a fee simple determinable 
 
298.  See Widgerow, supra note 22, at 507. 
299.  Id.; see also Young, supra note 216, at 12–13 (“When the areas involved are large 
and government agencies are poorly endowed with capacity and resources, individual users 
may exploit the relevant resources without worrying about the impact of enforcement opera-
tions.”). 
300.  See Widgerow, supra note 22, at 513. 
301.  Id. at 513.  
 
 [A] new property law regime, modeled after U.S. common law property principles, 
can open outer space to private ventures while retaining the best aspects of the com-
mon sovereignty philosophy at the heart of current space law. Although this argument 
concedes that exclusive possession of any portion of space, the planets, and other ce-
lestial bodies is both inconceivable under space law and undesirable, it argues that a 
system of leaseholds, licenses, reversionary interests, easements, and covenants are 
ideal for a newly configured space law regime. 
 
 Id. at 494.  
302.  Id. at 511. 
303.  Id. at 513. 
304.  Widgerow, supra note 22, at 511. 
305.  Id. at 513. 
306.  See id. at 513; see also Saunders, supra note 241, at 1386 (“[G]eneral statutory recog-
nition of a small group’s right to stake property or property-like claims (such as legally en-
forceable usufructuary claims) would eliminate the type of politics that led to the controversial 
recommendation of the subzone task force committee.”). 
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creates an automatic reversion to the grantor upon the occurrence of the 
condition—the grantor need not assert the right of reverter in order to 
reestablish possession of the property.”307 A third type of defeasible fee 
is a “fee simple subject to executory limitation[, which] reverts ownership 
upon the occurrence of a specified event or condition not back to the 
grantor, but to an heir or third party.”308 In each of these situations, a fee 
simple is less than absolute because it can revert back to the grantor or a 
third party if some later condition occurs.309 In the case of development 
of outer space resources, examples of later changes in circumstances that 
could revert title to the grantor might be those that damage the resource 
or make its continued development non-sustainable, or the developer’s 
violation of international law or any terms regulating or otherwise 
limiting their actions. 
Leases and licenses are additional examples of impermanent types 
of property transfers.310 While a lease transfers exclusive possession of 
property from a grantor to a grantee, the transfer is only for a limited 
period of time; a license does not transfer any property and merely allows 
one party to use property that is managed and controlled by another 
party.311 Then there are easements, which “are rights, conveyed with the 
property.”312 Easements generally allow the property owner who owns 
the transferred property to continue to make some specified use of it.313 
A negative easement, on the other hand, allows the entity that transferred 
property to prohibit the person who received it from using it in a specified 
way.314 Covenants are found in property conveyances and may prevent 
the grantee from using the property in some specific way.315 
In each situation, not only is less than a full fee interest in property 
 
307.  Widgerow, supra note 22, at 511. 
308.  Id. 
309.  See id. at 511. 
310.  Id. at 512. 
311.  Id. 
312.  Widgerow, supra note 22, at 512 (describing life estates where the estate terminates 
when the holder dies, at which point the estate can revert back to the grantor or a third party). 
However, these appear of limited utility in outer space this early in space development. See 
id. at 513. 
313.  Id. at 512. 
314.  Id.  
315.  Id. at 512–13 (“A covenant is an agreement between the grantor and grantee in a 
property conveyance that particular actions or conditions will or will not arise in connection 
with the grantee’s possession of the property. More specifically, a negative covenant restricts 
the grantee from performing a specified action in connection with the property, and a restric-
tive covenant limits the use of the property by the grantee in some way. . . . [A]ffirmative 
[covenants require] that the grantee perform some action or maintain some situation as a con-
dition of the conveyance.”).  
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conveyed, but that interest can be restricted in a multitude of ways.316 In 
some situations, when the restrictive conditions are not complied with, 
the property can revert back to its original holder; in other cases, the 
reversion is automatic if conditions contained in the grant occur.317 But, 
each situation is predicated on some entity owning or holding the 
property in question, which would violate the terms of international space 
law unless the entity was some international authority.318 An international 
organization could establish specific rules governing activities in outer 
space, oversee their implementation, and enforce them.319 The 
International Seabed Authority (ISA), established by UNCLOS, could 
serve as a model for such an authority.320 The ISA was established in 
1994 and since then it has issued new regulations governing exploring 
and prospecting for marine mineral resources and has contracted with 
seven nations granting them exclusive fifteen-year prospecting rights.321 
However, “[t]here are drawbacks to forming a new international 
body to oversee the exploitation of space resources.”322 They can be 
expensive to establish and support.323 Non-spacefaring nations might not 
want to invest money in a venture which might “freeze them out of the 
decision-making process and put them at a disadvantage if they someday 
are able to participate in lunar missions.”324 There are the inevitable 
questions that arise whenever a new international governing organization 
is created, such as whether it should be under the authority of the United 
Nations or be completely independent, and how power should be 
allocated between spacefaring nations and developing countries without 
the expertise of money to venture into space.325 Further, there is an 
underlying equity question about spending money to create a new 
 
316.  See Widgerow, supra note 22, at 511–13.  
317.  See id. at 511–12.  
318.  Id. at 513. 
319.  See Coffey, supra note 29, at 133. “This proposal aligns with [A]rticle 11(5) of the 
Moon [Treaty], which requires that an international regime be created to govern the exploita-
tion of natural resources on the moon when such exploitation is about to become feasible.” 
Id. 
320.  See id. at 134 (“The ISA is divided into separate bodies with designated functions. 
Every party to UNCLOS is represented in the Assembly, which makes decisions about sharing 
mining revenues and considers problems of a general nature. The Assembly appoints seats in 
the ISA’s executive body, the Council, to ensure that both developing nations and those with 
a substantial interest in mining are represented. Remaining seats are distributed to assure eq-
uitable geographic distribution.”). 
321.  See id. at 135. 
322.  Id. at 136.  
323.  Coffey, supra note 29, at 136.  
324.  Id.  
325.  Id.  
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administrative authority.326 That authority will spend money that might 
otherwise have helped poorer countries develop the capacity to 
participate in outer space directly.327 
An alternative to creating a new entity and new laws to administer a 
private property system in outer space is to extend terrestrial property law 
to outer space.328 Coffey proposes dividing the ISS between participating 
nations and then allowing each participant nation to apply its law to its 
assigned portion.329 But, this alternative suffers from some of the same 
flaws that establishing a centralized authority suffers—namely, it allows 
the powerful countries to control activities in outer space, specifically 
access.330 It allows those countries to collectively “set precedent for 
property rights in space instead of establishing formal international laws 
that the international community agrees upon.”331 The proposal 
“disregards the ‘common heritage’ provision of the OST,” because it 
completely excludes developing nations, who likely are not participants 
in the ISS, and provides them with no benefits from resources derived 
from space unless they eventually become technically proficient.332 
Allowing countries to dictate any agreement that governs behavior in 
outer space also presents a risk that a country may be excluded from 
participation for unrelated reasons, like “diplomatic problems between 
the nations, unwillingness to share equipment and resources, or pressure 
from other members.”333 
Thus, while establishing a private property regime in outer space 
might encourage development of celestial resources, it is hard to design 
a way around the ban against appropriating property and to establish a 
 
326.  See id. 
327.  See id. (“There is also questionable value in creating a structure which is supposed to 
allocate profits and benefits to developing countries but which consumes funds that might 
have otherwise been put toward helping those nations directly.”); see also DiMaria, supra 
note 28, at 437–38 (“Protecting the resource interests of nonspacefaring countries represents 
a further issue in forming this organization. One possible solution entails language that results 
in resource sharing only after the entity that obtained the resources makes a fair profit for its 
risk. Alternatively, this organization could set a flat rate, obtaining a small portion of all re-
sources acquired and distributing them to nonspacefaring members of the organization.”). 
328.  Coffey, supra note 29, at 142 (discussing such a proposal with respect to the ISS). 
329.  See id. (“Each member registers its own components of the ISS and retains jurisdic-
tion over them subject to provisions of overall station management. Thus, Russian law gov-
erns in the sections Russia contributed to the space station, and American law governs in the 
modules that the United States supplied.”). 
330.  See id. at 144. 
331.  Id. at 143. “This means that when other nations eventually do participate in such ac-
tivities, they likely will be bound by customary law that they did not play a role in shaping 
and that is disadvantageous to them.” Id. at 143–44. 
332.  Coffey, supra note 29, at 144.  
333.  Id. 
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system that is both workable and protects the interests of less developed 
countries. 
B. Space Under a Commons Property Regime 
This Section discusses what about space makes it more like a 
commons than private property. Indeed, early space treaties treated space 
as though it was a commons.334 But, like private property, commons also 
have negative features that may be problematic in space, and simply 
declaring something a commons does not dictate the rules under which it 
should be managed. When various commons management approaches are 
tried, like the law of first possession under a private property regime, they 
are also found wanting.335 
 1. Early Treaties and Analogous Areas of the Globe 
Early treaties, such as the 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of 
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space, which “requires space-faring nations to rescue stranded 
astronauts and wayward objects and return them to the appropriate 
country,” “envisions space as a commons beyond the possession and 
control of any one nation or people.”336 So too, the 1972 Convention on 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, which “was 
established to resolve concerns over financial liability in the event that a 
spacecraft or other space machine causes damage to other space-based or 
[e]arth-bound assets,” and the 1975 Convention on Registration of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space, which “imposes a requirement that 
states maintain and submit to the [United Nations] thorough records of 
all objects launched into outer space.”337 
Indeed, the 1967 OST “allocates the use of orbital space as if it were 
a common property resource”338 by declaring outer space an open access 
resource and banning appropriation by any country.339 Jared Taylor notes 
that “during the Treaty’s preliminary negotiations, one drafter analogized 
the absence of property rights in space to the absence of property rights 
 
334.  Taylor, supra note 31, at 259–60; Widgerow, supra note 22 at 504. 
335.  See Pearl, supra note 243, at 1036 (“Economic principles recognize that depending 
on ‘whether the resources are common pool or amenable to privatization, particular natural 
resource configurations, technological constraints, and transactions costs may make common 
property a superior solution to private property.’”). 
336.  Widgerow, supra note 22, at 504 (citing Rescue Treaty, supra note 122). 
337.  Id. (first citing Space Liability Treaty, supra note 121; and then citing Convention on 
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 
U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15). 
338.  Taylor, supra note 31, at 259. 
339.  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, arts. I–II. 
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in the ocean.”340 According to Taylor, later treaties, as well as the 
practices engaged in by spacefaring nations and private companies, “have 
confirmed the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty: space is a resource from 
which no nation or private entity can be excluded”341—a true open access 
commons.342 
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty343 established “the foundation for 
international space law.”344 Like outer space, Antarctica and the oceans 
“presented a dilemma regarding habitation and defense. No nation 
occupied these territories and no nation desired a ‘race to own’ without a 
guarantee of who would emerge victorious.”345 Both the Antarctic Treaty 
and the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (the “Deep Seabed 
Act”)346 eschewed the concept of private property as well as the rights of 
first possession, in part, because the riches of those areas might allow 
developing nations to share in those riches as opposed to remaining 
economically marginalized.347 The Deep Seabed Act provides a model 
for how to regulate activities in a commons, like outer space, which it 
manages to do without privatizing the marine resource.348 As a result, it 
is “customary and accepted legal reasoning” to analogize between private 
 
340.  Taylor, supra note 31, at 259. 
341.  Id. at 259–60. 
342.  See Nevala, supra note 34, at 1512.  
 
 Even though a satellite appears on a State’s registry, the private owner retains his 
property rights in the satellite. Under the Outer Space Treaty, ‘[a] State Party to the 
Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain 
jurisdiction and control over such object.’ . . . Furthermore, the [OST] establishes that 
themere [sic] fact that an individual launches an object into space does not impact his 
ownership.  
 
 Id. at 1512–13 (internal footnotes omitted). Since “property rights are essentially expressions 
of sovereignty, questions arise as to whether governments can extend their property laws to 
objects in outer space.” Id. at 1513. 
343.  Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. 
344.  Brehm, supra note 1, at 357. “[A]s early as 1958, scholars recognized that space law 
could draw on the Antarctic model, as another territory ‘placed under an internationalized or 
“trust” arrangement.’” Johnson, supra note 75, at 1493 n.84. “In September 1960, President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed that the principles of the Antarctic Treaty be used to form 
an international agreement governing outer space.” Brehm, supra note 1, at 357. 
345.  Buxton, supra note 2, at 691; see also Johnson, supra note 75, at 1515 (“Space is 
indeed very much like the high seas in that it is physically difficult to maintain exclusive 
control over a given area.”).  
346.  Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553 (1980) 
(codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1542 (2012)). 
347.  Buxton, supra note 2, at 691; Widgerow, supra note 22, at 509. 
348.  30 U.S.C. § 1402(a); Widgerow, supra note 22, at 509. “Thus, the Deep Seabed Act 
is a notable achievement in that it succeeds in spurring and protecting private investment in 
an area of the global commons while simultaneously reserving such areas as the ‘common 
heritage of mankind.’” Widgerow, supra note 22, at 509. 
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ownership rights outside of national sovereignty, like those the Deep 
Seabed Act granted, and a “land claims recognition law for celestial 
bodies.”349 
“The oceans and Antarctica . . . have much in common with the 
moon. They can be harsh environments that are difficult to reach to 
extract minerals [and are resource rich]. They are also designated 
international areas in which no nation has a sovereign claim.”350 The 
history of the earth’s oceans is a progression from “the domain of 
conquering armadas and privateers, when good legal title required as little 
as arbitrary lines drawn on a map,” to the concept of a “free sea” open to 
all countries, where no single country could “obstruct the use of that 
privilege.”351 International space law built on that history of open passage 
and “free sea.”352 The roots of the idea of granting non-space faring 
nations right of access can also be found in the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the High Seas, which granted “landlocked states the right to sail the 
oceans by requiring their coastal neighbors to grant free passage over land 
and through territorial waters.”353 The legal framework of UNCLOS 
united “a broad spectrum of national and private interests into a shared 
agreement on the possession and usage of a seemingly borderless area of 
the global commons,” setting another useful precedent for outer space.354 
However, UNCLOS, as a model, is impractical in “the vast reaches of 
outer space”—space is simply too vast and unlimited.355 
 2. Common Property 
Common property is property, the rights to which belong to more 
than one entity.356 Like private property, common property is endemic to 
 
349.  Wasser & Jobes, supra note 98, at 62; see also Widgerow, supra note 22, at 509 
(“Specifically, Section 3 of the Deep Seabed Act, entitled, ‘Disclaimer of Extraterritorial Sov-
ereignty,’ states that the United States ‘exercises its jurisdiction over United States citizens 
and vessels . . . in the exercise of the high seas freedom to engage in exploration for, and 
commercial recovery of, hard mineral resources of the deep seabed in accordance with gen-
erally accepted principles of international law,’ but that the United States ‘does not thereby 
assert sovereignty or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any areas or 
resources in the deep seabed.’”). But see Young, supra note 216, at 7. Although “[v]arious 
forms of land ownership have emerged and played influential roles in most societies over 
several thousand years[,] . . . there are few parallel practices pertaining to marine systems or 
seas and oceans,” which have more in common with space than terrestrial property. Id. 
350.  Coffey, supra note 29, at 129. 
351.  Johnson, supra note 75, at 1488. 
352.  See id. at 1489. 
353.  Id. (citing Convention on the High Seas art. 3, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 
U.N.T.S. 82). 
354.  See Widgerow, supra note 22, at 507. 
355.  Id.  
356.  See Saunders, supra note 241, at 1357. “Because law typically evolves incrementally, 
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life in the United States and always has been, even though many 
Americans view it ambivalently.357 There is considerable overlap 
between property held in common and that which is privately owned. 
Carol Rose suggests that collective, but privately owned property, like a 
tenancy in common, “has all the hallmarks of individual private 
property,” and, therefore, should not be seen as “fundamentally 
problematic or prone to inefficient use.”358 Additionally, the plasticity of 
the commons, demonstrated by the appearance of new commons, like the 
“knowledge commons, cultural commons, infrastructure commons, and 
neighborhood commons,” indicates that the concept might fit in outer 
space.359 
A commons, or CPR, is frequently asserted to resist “privatization 
and/or commodification of those resources,” making it oppositional to a 
claim that something is private property.360 Sheila Foster and Christian 
Iaione’s suggestion that the “language of the ‘commons’” is often used 
to prevent the enclosure of public urban space “by economic elites,” 
resonates with the situation in outer space where wealthy countries or 
private companies want to claim or enclose space that the public owns.361 
A claim that something is a commons acknowledges that “it is a shared 
resource that belongs to all of its inhabitants,”362 like outer space, which 
 
a group-level right is most likely to emerge as the logical extension of an analogous right that 
is already well accepted.” Id. at 1328. “If property law does develop like water law, it will 
increasingly exist as a collection of use-rights, rights defined in specific contexts and in terms 
of similar rights held by other people.” Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in 
Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1531 (1989).  
357.  See Pearl, supra note 243, at 1060–61 (“Rose explored the American legal culture’s 
deeply ingrained skepticism of collective ownership of property and the marginalization of 
community property forms.”). 
358.  Id. at 1032–33; see also Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 292–93 (“Rose found that 
some British courts considered these resources [ones used by the public, like for Maypole 
dancing,] ‘inherently public property,’ on the basis of the enhanced value that public use gen-
erated, and vested in the public the right to use property otherwise subject to exclusive private 
control.”). “Rose famously described commons ownership structures as ‘commons on the in-
side’ and ‘[private] property on the outside.’” Pearl, supra note 243, at 1051. 
359.  Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 284 (“More recently, scholars across an array of 
specialties have conceptualized and articulated new kinds of commons, beyond those recog-
nized in the traditional fields of property and environmental law. These ‘new’ commons in-
clude knowledge commons, cultural commons, infrastructure 
 commons, and neighborhood commons, among others.”). 
360.  Id. at 283–84. “[T]he commons is less a description of the resource and its character-
istics and more of a normative claim to the resource. In these situations, the claim is to open 
up (or to re-open) access to a good—i.e., to recognize the community’s right to access and to 
use a resource which might otherwise be under exclusive private or public control—on ac-
count of the social value or utility that such access would generate or produce for the com-
munity.” Id. at 287 (internal footnotes omitted). 
361.  See id. at 283. 
362.  Id. at 287. 
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is the “province of all mankind.”363 
But there are problems with the idea of declaring anything a 
commons, just like there are problems with declaring something private 
property. One problem with the commons approach is the inability to 
exclude members of the commons from using the resource.364 Lacking 
the right to exclude, a user of CPRs has no incentive to do anything other 
than fully exploit the commons because if she refrains, her co-users 
will.365 The result is an “open access resource vulnerable to the tragic 
conditions of rivalry, overexploitation, and degradation.”366 Another 
problem is that since under a commons property regime the rights and 
interests of the present generation dominate those of future generations, 
there is no assurance that the claims of an unidentified future generation 
will have any effect on how the commons is managed.367 There are also 
 
363.  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. I. 
364.  Pearl, supra note 243, at 1053 (“The absence of the right to exclude is what allows 
the tragedy of the ‘privatized commons’ to exist.”).  
 
 Ostrom frames the problem of collective action as an absence of the right to exclude. 
In an unmanaged commons, a member of the group “cannot be excluded from obtain-
ing the benefits of a collective good once the good is produced.” There is no legal 
right for anyone to oust another individual. Therefore, there is “little incentive to con-
tribute voluntarily to the provision of that good.”  
 
 Id. at 1030 (internal footnotes omitted). 
365.  Id. at 1029 (“The right to exclude . . . is the basis for incorporating the needs of future 
generations in the present management of the CPR.”). 
366.  Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 287.  
 
 Limited-access commons are able to avoid tragic outcomes because they operate 
through a set of explicit or implicit usage and membership constraints designed to 
protect against overconsumption and exploitation. On the other hand, truly open ac-
cess resources, like Hardin’s pasture, in which exclusion is impossible or costly, are 
vulnerable to the tendency toward rivalry, exploitation and degradation or exhaustion 
of the resources. 
 
 Id. at 292 (internal footnote omitted). However, Rose has noted that “there are some open-
access resources, particularly land, in which increased use does not create rivalry but rather 
enhanced utility or value for the public, such that these resources become essential or highly 
functional resources for city inhabitants.” Id. 
367.  See Pearl, supra note 243, at 1028–29 (“In effect, an owner of a private right to use 
land acts as a broker whose wealth depends on how well he takes into account the competing 
claims of the present and the future. But with communal rights there is no broker, and the 
claims of the present generation will be given an uneconomically large weight in determining 
the intensity with which the land is worked. Future generations might desire to pay present 
generations enough to change the present intensity of land usage. But they have no living 
agent to place their claims on the market. Under a communal property system, should a living 
person pay others to reduce the rate at which they work the land, he would not gain anything 
of value for his efforts.”). 
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management difficulties.368 “Under a communal system, one member 
wishing to preserve the CPR for future generations’ use faces 
significant—and perhaps insurmountable—transaction costs of 
negotiating with all members of the community and paying them to use 
the resource suboptimally.”369 And, exiting a commons when group 
action causes individual harm, without destroying “social gains from 
cooperation,” can be difficult.370 
There is no one-size-fits-all solution to these problems, and there 
may be multiple approaches to the development of solutions.371 In the 
search for solutions, various legal scholars have promoted variations on 
the concept of a commons, highlighting different features.372 Pearl 
proposes something he labels the “vital commons,” which includes CPRs 
that are “essential to human existence,” like air or water, and which may 
require a different approach to their management.373 Pearl’s vital 
commons has five key traits: 
(1) the benefits of the CPR are internalized by nearly all members of a 
given massive population; (2) the costs of the CPR’s depletion are 
externalized among nearly all members of that same massive 
population; (3) augmentation or depletion of the CPR by one party 
affects the ability to use the CPR by another party within the same 
massive population; (4) the CPR itself is necessary for sustenance; and 
5) damage or depletion of the CPR is non-remediable or extremely 
difficult to correct.374 
Outer space has most of these traits—the potentially affected 
 
368.  See id. at 1033 (“Rose makes an important distinction between the forms of collective 
management of CPRs. On the one hand, she notes the well-known lobster fishing community 
that has institutions which govern the resource in a sustainable manner. However, she notes 
that the institutions operate via low-level violence.”). 
369.  Id. at 1029. “Heller points out that while there may very well be circumstances where 
commons resources are inefficiently overused, excessive privatization of a commons resource 
may result in underuse, which is similarly inefficient.” Id. at 1034. 
370.  Id. at 1035–36 (internal footnotes omitted) (“Heller and Dagan . . . posit that preserv-
ing the right to exit is an essential attribute of a liberal commons and must exist. At a mini-
mum, it must exist as a form of self-defense from harm caused by the group. The other com-
ponent of their goal is to promote cooperation while maximizing economic gains and 
recognizing social value. Cooperation can result in benefits of economies of scale and risk 
spreading.”). 
371.  Young, supra note 216, at 15. 
372.  See Pearl, supra note 243, at 1029–38 (outlining the variations on the commons of 
multiple legal scholars, including Elinor Ostrom, Carol Rose, Hanoch Dagan, Michael Heller, 
and Lee Anne Fennell). From her work on the commons, Ostrom concludes that an error of 
CPR scholars is “oversimplification.” Id. at 1032. 
373.  Id. at 1040. “Two types of CPRs immediately meet this definition: major groundwater 
aquifers and the [e]arth’s atmosphere.” Id. at 1041 
374.  Id. at 1041. 
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population is the entire globe; its resources, as far as is known, are not 
renewable; and the benefits and costs of development of outer space 
resources could be widely internalized or externalized.375 Additionally, 
restoration of any depleted resources in outer space may be difficult, and 
the impact on any of those resources may be so dire that its overuse and 
depletion could be “the epitome of apocalypse.”376 Finally, the vastness 
of outer space makes it difficult to subject it to “local” regulation—i.e., 
regulation by individual nations, which might opt not to regulate certain 
activities or to regulate lightly.377 
Similar to Garrett Hardin’s open pasture, a major problem with a 
commons is that, “absent a system that allocates use rights, it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to restrain the impulse of users to pursue their 
individual self-interests, even when pursuit of those interests result in the 
degradation or exhaustion of the resource.”378 This is why, he argued, 
“‘freedom in the commons’—i.e., the lack of controls on individual 
behavior and self-interest—ultimately leads to its ruin and hence to the 
‘tragedy.’”379 If the amount of use of a CPR or the intensity of that use is 
too much, then the result can be “congestion” that decreases the values of 
those resources.380 “Similarly, certain types of uses can create 
 
375.  See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 59.  
376.  Pearl, supra note 243, at 1053. 
377.  See Pearl, supra note 243, at 1056–57 (“The problem with allowing certain areas to 
be unregulated or lightly regulated is that the Ogallala Aquifer is not susceptible to parceling 
out differential rules. The aquifer stretches across eight states . . . .”). 
378.  Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 295. 
379.  Id.; see also Arnold, supra note 237, at 1233–34 (quoting SHELL FISH COMM’RS OF 
THE STATE OF CONN., THIRD REPORT OF THE SHELL FISH COMMISSIONERS, Jan. Sess., at 13 
(1884)) (“The state commissioners described this problem as a classic tragedy of the com-
mons: . . . ‘In the free scramble for the oysters, [the natural growthers] have no thought but 
“to keep what they get and catch what they can,” and it would be lost time to them to dredge 
for stars while others dredge for oysters.’”); Pearl, supra note 243, at 1040 (“Three traits 
clearly exist in any tragedy of the commons: (1) resource scarcity, (2) internalization of ben-
efits, and (3) the externalization of costs.”). The key to creating a tragedy is the imbalance 
between resources and consumers of those resources. Id. “Fennell suggests that there are many 
reasons why people make ‘suboptimal decisions with regard to resources under common or 
interdependent control.’ Participants ‘may lack information or the means to communicate 
with each other, they may fall prey to cognitive biases or strong emotions, or they may suffer 
from wealth, liquidity, or power differentials that leave some options unavailable.’” Id. at 
1038. Oran Young uses limited fish stocks to make this point, saying, “So long as supply 
demonstrably and reliably exceeds the demand of all the members of the user group, the ab-
sence of rights and rules may not matter much. In other words, a system of null property may 
be perfectly acceptable under these circumstances. The problem occurs when rising demand 
exceeds supply.” Young, supra note 216, at 11. 
380.  See Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 297 (“Too much usage, either in volume or 
intensity, of a park or a neighborhood street, for example, can quickly result in the kind of 
congestion that degrades these spaces.”); see also Pearl, supra note 243, at 1027 (“Hardin 
reminds us of Aristotle’s maxim. ‘That which is common to the greatest number [of people] 
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incompatibilities with many ordinary uses and conservation of such 
spaces, creating the conditions for rivalry or subtractability.”381 
The unbounded nature of space and the variety and wealth of its 
resources is already attracting potential users with competing or 
conflicting ideas about how space should be used.382 Even if space was 
regulated, this “magnetic pull” to occupy and develop space may create 
rivalry among different users, especially if those users are drawn to the 
same areas of outer space.383 Unless the development of outer space 
resources is regulated, too many entities vying for the same resource 
could lead not only to congestion and rivalous behavior,384 but also to 
accidents and serious conflict—the conditions the space treaties are 
intended to avoid.385 
 
has the least care bestowed on it.’”). “The point is that the kind of open spaces, or commons, 
that are an essential part of cities and that give cities much of their value can be contested in 
ways that require rethinking the governance and management of those spaces.” Foster & 
Iaione, supra note 222, at 298. 
381.  Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 298. “There is no one system that can satisfactorily 
mediate the tensions that arise from rivalry for common resources, nor that can resolve distri-
butional inequalities with regard to those resources.” Id. at 334. 
382.  See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 63–64. 
383.  Cf. Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 312 (“[C]onventional zoning, and other land 
use laws, also fall short of being able to comprehensively and satisfactorily manage or govern 
the city commons. . . . [T]he openness of cities and the variety of commons within them in-
evitably invite rivalry as different users are drawn to agglomerate in cities. This seemingly 
magnetic pull, along with the strain of proximity of heterogeneous users, creates the pre-con-
ditions for rivalry even in heavily regulated spaces.”). 
384.  Id. at 298–99. Foster and Iaione contend that the tragedy of many city commons arises 
from “weakly or poorly regulated space . . . [also known as] ‘regulatory slippage.’ In other 
words, these are spaces that were perhaps once heavily regulated to avoid rivalry but where 
such control has slipped, for whatever reason, significantly behind previous levels of public 
control or management.” Id. “[U]nrestrained competition for collectively shared resources 
intensifies and the existing regulatory infrastructure is (or becomes) inadequate to manage 
[the] rivalry.” Id. at 312.  
385.  As noted earlier in this Article, developing an effective regulatory framework for ac-
tivities in outer space is difficult to do given the absence of a single regulatory sovereign. See 
discussion supra Part II. Jessica Coulter writes about the Pacific Garbage Patch, pointing out 
that  
 
 “[i]ndividual consumers and manufacturers do not directly bear the costs of the neg-
ative externalities that result from plastic escaping into the sea. They do, however, 
realize benefits from plastic consumption . . . [j]ust as there is no international frame-
work that holds individual actors responsible for climate change, there is no interna-
tional obligation for nations to compensate an injured party for damage incurred from 
land-based marine pollution. Because no one nation has regulatory authority over or 
liability for waste problems in the Pacific Ocean, nations lack motivation to solve the 
problem alone.”  
 
 Jessica R. Coulter, A Sea Change to Change the Sea: Stopping the Spread of the Pacific Gar-
bage Parch with Small-Scale Environmental Legislation, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 
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The way to prevent a tragedy on land held in common is not 
necessarily its transformation to private property, which is one solution 
Hardin called for.386 Oran Young says “[i]nstitutional innovation,” like 
individual transferable quotas, “can create a form of private property and, 
in the process, alleviate the perverse incentives arising from the condition 
of non-excludability.”387 Creating public property or, in the alternative, 
using regulatory controls can also avoid the tragedy to the commons.388 
The owners of a commons can also self-regulate to control the adverse 
effects of non-excludability.389 
But as Young notes, while each approach has its plus side, each 
approach, like privatization, can also have negative effects.390 
“Privatization can lead to outcomes that are grossly unfair[, and] 
[g]overnments [may] lack both the capacity and the will to manage public 
property well.”391 And common property approaches can lead to non-
sustainable use of the property, and “work best in situations where the 
sense of community is strong and social pressure is capable of controlling 
behavior effectively”—characteristics uncommon in outer space.392 
So, we have learned thus far that (1) the race is on to extract valuable 
resources from outer space and celestial bodies;393 (2) the international 
legal framework governing those activities is far from complete, inviting 
behavior that may be in the economic best interests of the actor, but not 
necessarily of the globe;394 (3) the international legal principles 
governing this behavior may be counter-productive when it comes to 
incentivizing economic behavior, but beneficial non-spacefaring 
 
1964–65 (2010). 
386.  See Young, supra note 216, at 8 (“Well-known but divergent prescriptions, in this 
context, call for a transition to private property through the creation of exclusion mechanisms 
(e.g., effective fences) or for a transition to public property through actions on the part of a 
government agency to claim ownership and impose restrictions on the use of the relevant 
resources (e.g., rules governing the harvesting of wildlife).”). 
387.  Id. at 12. 
388.  Id. 
389.  Id. (“Common property systems also can and often do give rise to restrictions on the 
behavior of individual users that serve to avoid or alleviate the tragedy of the commons.”). 
390.  Id. 
391.  Young, supra note 216, at 12.  
392.  Id.; see also Saunders, supra note 241, at 1349 (“Ostrom concludes that a small, ho-
mogenous group that is highly dependent on the resource in question and has the autonomy 
to make binding rules will be more likely to develop informal rules than groups that do not 
share those qualities, or which share them to a lesser extent.”). “[C]ommon property arrange-
ments are generally inadequate to manage human uses of highly migratory resources.” Young, 
supra note 216, at 13. 
393.  See, e.g., Brehm, supra note 1. 
394.  See, e.g., Reinstein, supra note 1, at 62–63. 
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countries;395 and (4) the push to privatize space, which is clearly a global 
commons, may lead to rivalrous behavior, which could dissolve into 
military activity and squeeze out poorer countries from the benefits of 
space, in direct contradiction of the goals of international space law.396 
We have also learned that while privatizing open access areas, like 
outer space, is not necessarily good or necessary to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons (the over-utilization of common or shared pool resources), 
the features of a commons make it difficult to avoid that tragedy and to 
provide for future generations.397 So the solution may lie in crafting new 
property regimes, perhaps combining the best features of both 
approaches. It is to that task this Article now turns—the circumstances in 
which new forms of property might emerge and what they might be. 
IV. NEW TYPES OF PROPERTY REGIMES THAT MIGHT WORK IN OUTER 
SPACE 
The rapidly closing gap in the technological ability of countries and 
private companies to develop resources in outer space makes it 
imperative to find a property regime that will allow management of those 
activities. Uncontrolled activities in outer space could lead to conflict 
among countries and commercial enterprises, as well as irreparable 
damage to and over-consumption of those resources.398 But the problems 
with both property regimes studied in Part III raise the question of 
whether a new form of property might allow for a more successful 
management approach. 
Generally, the process of changing from one property regime to 
another requires that certain conditions occur, such as changes in 
technology, the means of economic production, or in social 
circumstances.399 However, property in outer space is more like null 
property to which no claim of ownership has yet been made.400 Hence, 
the situation here does not involve changing from one type of property to 
 
395.  See, e.g., Buxton, supra note 2, at 692–93. 
396.  See, e.g., Coffey, supra note 29, at 125. 
397.  See Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 295. 
398.  See id. 
399.  See Arnold, supra note 237, at 1212 (“[W]hen changes in the circumstances of eco-
nomic production make it more profitable to society as a whole to establish a new property 
regime, such a regime will tend to emerge, whether through legislation, judicial decisions, or 
the evolution of social mores.”). In his article, Arnold describes the changes in the property 
regime governing oystering in Connecticut, calling the natural oyster beds an “anomaly.” See 
id. at 1235. “Under this system, valuable beds were subjected to a common property system 
that reduced output and promoted waste. Yet, despite its disadvantages, this system persisted 
for decades.” Id. 
400.  See Young, supra note 216, at 6 (discussing the concept of null property). 
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another. Rather, it calls for the creation of a new type of property, one 
that can function in an unfamiliar world and open that world to terrestrial 
activities in an unregulated environment. These factors might create the 
circumstances in which a new form of property emerge. 
One new type is “hybrid property,” which combines different types 
of property.401 Hybrid property regimes sometimes emerge because they 
perform a particular political function.402 Here, the political function 
would be the enablement of an effective regulatory regime in outer space. 
Hybrid property can improve the efficiency and stability of traditional 
property regimes and can encourage the creation of important social 
goods.403 An example of a hybrid property regime is one that is 
sometimes private and sometimes common; for example, where private 
property may be open for collective uses.404 Public dedication “reflects a 
peculiar hybrid doctrine which grants private rights in public spaces 
based on the reliance interests of those who purchased land—typically at 
higher prices—on the understanding that adjacent land would remain 
subject to public use.”405 One might find a hybrid property regime in outer 
space where land that has been temporarily enclosed to allow some 
development activity to take place is also open to public use, like 
government-sponsored scientific research or privately sponsored tourism. 
“Property hybridity can emerge and survive not only when it is 
 
401.  Arnold, supra note 237, at 1211 (“[R]eality often contradicts the conventional tale of 
evolution toward efficient formal privatization and that alternative property systems often 
prove viable because they fulfill important societal needs—economic and otherwise. . . . 
[T]hese viable alternative property systems include hybrid regimes—that is, regimes that im-
pose different property rules at different points in space or time.”); id. at 1247 (“[M]any forms 
of property regulation other than formal privatization can promote economic efficiency, in-
cluding internally heterogeneous, or hybrid, property systems, as Connecticut’s experience 
demonstrates.”). 
402.  Id. at 1211 (“[H]ybrid regimes can emerge and thrive because of their political func-
tions.”).  
403.  Id. at 1216. 
404.  See id. at 1216–17 (internal footnotes omitted) (“[Henry] Smith coined the term ‘sem-
icommons’ to describe a regime in which a resource is sometimes common and sometimes 
private, and in which ‘both common and private uses are important and impact significantly 
on each other.’ Smith illustrated the semicommons concept through the apparently inefficient 
but surprisingly durable medieval open-field system. Under this regime, land was held and 
farmed privately most of the time, but at certain times the private right to exclude was sus-
pended to allow for grazing by the village’s collective herd across all parcels. . . . [H]ybrid 
regimes benefit from regulation, whether formal or informal, to prevent individuals from ex-
ploiting hybridity to their benefit but to the community’s detriment.”). 
405.  Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 319. There is a danger that this doctrine can be 
used in a way that enables property owners to “act solely in their self-interest, without any 
democratic check, and in ways that are not clearly in the public interest or even for the benefit 
of the particular public space.” Id. at 319–20. 
BABCOCK FINAL ARTICLE 6/20/2019  1:28 PM 
244 Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 69:191 
economically optimal but also when it fulfills political imperatives.”406 If 
the political imperative in outer space is to develop some form of property 
regime that meets the needs of public and private investors in space while 
providing access for non-space faring nations and their citizens, then 
maybe some form of hybridity that allows for overlapping forms of 
property or governance should be used rather than exclusive zones where 
one form of property is allowed and another is not allowed.407 There may 
be political support for “such a spatial compromise” where the hybrid 
regime preserves and strengthens “existing informal governance 
mechanisms in open-access areas.”408 Further, these hybrid regimes, 
because of the role of local—even community-based—government, may 
avoid some of the back-channel dealings that disfavor entities, in this case 
disempowered countries and their citizens.409 But where there is 
“jurisdictional complexity”—i.e., the involvement of many jurisdictions 
in the affected area—it may be more difficult to work out the 
arrangements among those jurisdictions to achieve any form of hybridity, 
overlapping or spatial.410 
The problem with establishing a spatially hybrid property regime (or 
any property regime) in outer space is the lack of definable boundaries 
where one type of approach might be possible in one area, and another in 
a different area, or even overlapping regimes in the same area.411 But the 
idea of co-locating disparate property regimes in a single area that overlap 
either temporally or spatially may reduce the need to have separate 
defined areas where one property regime is based on private property 
precepts and the other on common ownership. Regardless of which 
approach is adopted—common property, private property, or some form 
of hybrid property—“efficient privatization does not inevitably triumph 
in property law and [ ] ultimately no single regime may triumph.”412 If 
anything, the rational tilt may be towards preserving public access to 
CPRs and to “push privatization further elsewhere rather than bringing 
 
406.  Arnold, supra note 237, at 1247. 
407.  See id. at 1248. 
408.  Id.  
409.  See id. 
410.  See id. at 1248 n.201 (“The jurisdictional complexity of the Chesapeake, which is 
split between two states, may also have complicated negotiation toward a grand bargain along 
the lines of Connecticut’s 1881 reforms, and the state’s political structure may have also con-
spired against compromise.”). 
411.  But see Arnold, supra note 237, at 1248 (“[F]ederal and state policymakers are in-
creasingly embracing marine spatial planning, in which sub-areas of the ocean are defined 
and subjected to different property rules (for example, rules that allow or forbid private leasing 
for energy production) as a politically and economically expedient alternative to traditional, 
more spatially uniform maritime regulation.”). 
412.  Id. at 1247 (drawing from research on oystering in Connecticut’s waters). 
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all areas under a regime that embodies both open access and private 
property features.”413 
Another property model is stewardship.414 Most scholars assume 
that “the classic property ownership concept is associated with traditional 
rights of alienability, title, and exclusion; and, it tends to overlook the 
possibility of non-owners exercising custodial duties over tangible and 
intangible goods in the absence of title and possession.”415 The 
“stewardship” model of property assumes that those who actually possess 
the property may not be its “ultimate owners.”416 
At the core of the stewardship model is the idea that “mankind is a 
steward of natural resources, especially [of] globally important 
[ones].”417 It “embodies a notion of mutual trusteeship.”418 The model 
permits title, possession, and exclusion to be disaggregated from each 
other.419 This enables the refiguring of “the rights of possession, use, and 
production among non-owners as well as owners.”420 Complete control 
of something is neither required nor does it guarantee possession of that 
thing.421 The fact that ownership of property is not necessary makes it 
attractive from the standpoint of international law. However, there are no 
rights implicit in stewardship and only duties with respect to the 
property.422 This makes it less attractive to those who want some return 
for their investment in space development.423 Thus, it offers less of an 
incentive to explore outer space, as well as no assurance about any 
equitable distribution of any benefits from development.424 
But, regardless of the type of property regime, how property will be 
managed in outer space is still to be determined. Various management 
approaches are discussed below in Part V. 
 
413.  Id. at 1248. 
414.  Hirschprung, supra note 226, at 149.  
415.  Id. 
416.  Id. 
417.  See Coulter, supra note 385, at 1995 (“Effective environmental legislation embodies 
the notion that mankind is a steward of natural resources, especially globally important re-
sources like the Pacific Ocean. Small policies can encourage widespread acceptance of the 
environmental moral imperative . . . .”). 
418.  Hirschprung, supra note 226, at 149–50.  
419.  Id. at 150. 
420.  Id. 
421.  Id. at 151. 
422.  Hirschprung notes that some who favor stewardship as a way to define ownership 
emphasize its “potential” to reform copyright law “by emphasizing the duties to the public 
that correlate with ownership rights.” See id. at 150. 
423.  See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 72 (suggesting that a degree of certainty is necessary 
to encourage investment and that for space development to be possible, investors must receive 
an early return on their investment). 
424.  See id. 
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V. HOW TO MANAGE PROPERTY IN OUTER SPACE 
[W]e must accord the highest priority to efforts to solve or avoid the 
tragedy of the commons, the free rider problem, and the harmful im-
pacts of side effects as they arise in connection with human/environment 
relations. For the most part, success in this endeavor will depend on 
our ability both to understand the sources of perverse incentives and to 
devise systems of rights and rules or, in other words, governance sys-
tems capable of altering incentives sufficiently to alleviate problems of 
this sort.425 
The lack of property lines or boundaries in outer space make it 
difficult to delineate an individual claim to ownership, which could lead 
to overlapping and conflicting claims of development rights. Assertion of 
ownership rights over space and its resources conflicts with the ban on 
appropriation of outer space in the governing treaties and could lead to 
rivalrous conditions, perhaps even to war. Without a management system 
that assures equitable access to and sharing of celestial resources, any 
form of property regime runs the risk of violating the equitable principles 
that animate the OST and Moon Treaty—that space should be developed 
for the benefit of all mankind.426 
The Article, to this point, has established that outer space is closer 
to a global commons than it is to private property. Yet, treating space as 
a global commons, as noted previously, poses a unique management 
problem: how to design a management approach that protects open access 
commons resources from overconsumption or damage while still 
incentivizing the development of those resources. Hardin believed that 
privatization of property was the best way to achieve efficiency and 
sustainability, Ellickson argued that informal norms were the best way to 
achieve “sustainable equilibrium,” and Ostrom promoted “a range of 
management techniques specific to that community in order to redirect 
the march towards total exhaustion.”427 While these ideas do not work in 
isolation for space, they each contribute in some way to a solution. 
 
425.  See Young, supra note 216, at 16. 
426.  See Reinstein, supra note 1, at 72. 
427.  Pearl, supra note 243, at 1047; see also Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 288 (“Har-
din famously postulated that threats of degradation and destruction of the commons give rise 
to either a system of centralized public regulation or the imposition of private property rights 
in order to avoid the ‘tragedy.’ Ostrom’s groundbreaking work, on the other hand, demon-
strated that there are options for commons management that are neither exclusively public nor 
exclusively private. Ostrom identified groups of users who were able to cooperate to create 
and enforce rules for using and managing natural resources—such as grazing land, fisheries, 
forests and irrigation waters—using ‘rich mixtures of public and private instrumentalities.’”). 
But see Pearl, supra note 243, at 1061 (“Ostrom’s model [of self-management] works under 
certain conditions—typically small CPRs—but the Ogallala is not among them.”). 
BABCOCK FINAL ARTICLE 6/20/2019  1:28 PM 
2019] The Public Trust in Space 247 
This Part identifies some management approaches designed to 
achieve those goals from the right of first possession rule to the 
application of norms, and evaluates each one for its suitability and ability 
to meet the dual goals of equitably and sustainably allowing the profitable 
development of outer space resources, as well as for its efficiency, 
fairness, cost effectiveness, and ease of implementation and enforcement. 
One conundrum is that 
not only does one size not fit all, but also there are apt to be multiple 
approaches to the development of solutions. To take a single example, 
any effort to avoid or alleviate the tragedy of the commons must include 
the creation of some sort of exclusion mechanism or system for 
rationing available supplies of the relevant good(s) or service(s) among 
prospective users. But it turns out that there are distinctive ways to meet 
this condition under structures of private property, common property, 
or public property.428 
This Part also shows that there are a number of solutions whose effects 
are comparable in terms of conservation, but are significantly different 
when criteria like “efficiency, equity, or robustness” are examined.429 
A. Hybrid Governance 
Hybrid forms of governance are a way of managing property.430 An 
example of a hybrid governance regime is a “nested governance system,” 
in which one form of governance, self- or local governance, is nested in 
a larger, “centralized governance regime.”431 In this management 
scenario, the public authority, which acts as a designer and mediator of 
these co-designed systems, becomes a “collaborative institutional 
ecosystem [of] manager[s]” enabling “the networks, actions and reactions 
of others in the ecosystem [to be] independent and free [while] nested 
 
428.  Young, supra note 216, at 16. 
429.  Id. 
430.  Arnold, supra note 237, at 1217. 
431.  Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 324–25 (internal footnotes omitted) (“In user-
managed scenarios, individuals exist in an interdependent relationship with each other and 
with the resource, and are strongly motivated to overcome collective action problems, collab-
oratively manage the resource, and enhance their productivity over time. In many of these 
cases, users are able to enforce and monitor their rules only with the help of external state 
agencies on whom they rely in instituting a complex, ‘nested’ governance system to regulate 
the resource but without subsuming these institutions into a centralized governance re-
gime. . . . Both formal and non-formal groups alike rely to some extent on the local govern-
ment to facilitate or enable their activities in managing and governing the commons. In this 
sense, they are ‘nested’ governance regimes that ‘claim’ the urban resource as an open-access 
common resource, allowing some class of users to work cooperatively and collaboratively to 
care for and manage it.”). 
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within the local government, consistent with a polycentric system.”432 
Elected officials “assist, collaborate, and provide technical guidance 
(data, legal advice, communication strategy, design strategies, 
sustainability models, etc.) to enable themselves to manage, mediate, and 
coordinate the ecosystem.”433 The public official becomes a manager who 
enables and supports “parts of the ecosystem to allow it to ‘nest’ within 
the larger policy of the city.”434 Arnold calls this nested system of 
governance a “spatially hybrid property regime.”435 Given the different 
levels of government that might be involved in outer space—
international, national, and even local—nested hybridity might become a 
reality. 
Another hybrid form of governing property, particularly commons, 
which contains separate, yet overlapping power centers is called 
“subsidiarity.”436 “Subsidiarity is the idea that power should be shared 
with ‘the lowest practicable tier of social organization, public or 
private.’”437 It is based on the impression that “governments look for 
allies at different hierarchical levels to facilitate the initiatives of 
proactive citizens who, individually or in groups, are willing to take direct 
care of the commons.”438 Space-faring nations could involve subunits of 
government in the actual management of space, like states, provinces, and 
towns, as well as special interest groups that might benefit from the 
development of space, like universities or space development 
enterprises.439 Foster and Iaione use horizontal subsidiarity as a means of 
 
432.  Id. at 336. “The challenge of networked governance may be that its structure resem-
bles a loosely coupled system, subject to fraying at the margins and not glued together enough 
to be organizationally coherent.” Id. at 335. 
433.  Id. at 336. 
434.  Id.  
435.  Arnold, supra note 237, at 1246; see also Pearl, supra note 243, at 1035 (“In the 
Liberal Commons, Heller and Dagan seek to demonstrate the benefits of ‘synthesizing fea-
tures of existing [property] types, private and commons, to create vigorous hybrids including 
the liberal commons.’”). 
436.  Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 288–89 (“In this article, we tease[d] out . . . a set 
of democratic design principles that can be replicated to manage or govern a range of shared 
urban goods and resources. These principles—horizontal subsidiarity, collaboration, and pol-
ycentrism—reorient public authorities away from a monopoly position over the use and man-
agement of common assets and toward a shared, collaborative governance approach. In other 
words, the Leviathan state gradually becomes what we call the facilitator, or enabling, state.”). 
437.  Id. at 325–26. “The governance regime for shared urban resources becomes one with-
out a dominant center but instead one in which all actors who have a stake in the commons 
are part of an autonomous center of decision making as co-partners, or co-collaborators, co-
ordinated and enabled by the public authority.” Id. at 289. However, Foster and Iaione warn 
that “although loosely coupled systems may be adaptive, they can lose consistency and pre-
dictability if repeatedly confronted with abrupt and unpredictable change.” Id. at 335. 
438.  Id. at 327. 
439.  See Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 326–27. “Horizontal subsidiarity thus prompts 
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engaging an active urban citizenry in maintaining the city for the 
collective welfare of its citizens.440 However, there is no reason to limit 
the principle’s application to the urban environment. Indeed, the goal of 
reorienting “public authorities away from the central state to an active 
citizenry willing to cooperatively govern common resources” seems 
equally useful in outer space where there are similar sub-governing 
units.441 Indeed, to the extent this approach breaks the tie between the 
space development industry and government and the industry’s push to 
realize the principle of first possession, subsidiarity as a management 
principle may hold some merit, if adjusted to meet the physical 
circumstances of outer space.442 And a nested system of governance or 
subsidiarity could involve interested parties in governance providing for 
more local resolution of conflicts, if and when there are regulations to 
apply. 
B. Application of the Right of First Possession Property Rule 
As noted previously, the space industry favors allowing ownership 
of property in outer space because it enables them to profit from their 
investment in the development of space resources and counter balances 
the risks of each venture they undertake.443 They argue that “[o]wnership 
 
governments to look for, and accept, allies to facilitate the initiatives of proactive citizens 
who, individually or in groups, are willing to take direct care of the common assets of the city. 
In a sense, the government is looking to share the responsibility of caring for common goods 
with an active citizenry. This ‘sharing’ implies that citizens are willing to act for the general 
interest—to be a city-maker rather than just a city-user.” Id. at 327 (emphasis added). 
440.  See id. at 326. 
441.  Id. at 328. Foster and Iaione also recommend a “polycentric system of governance,” 
which reduces the state to providing these subgroups with the “necessary tools (including 
appropriate public policies packaged as collaborative devices), connecting the several net-
works of actors, and helping the so-called ‘collaborative class’ to enlarge the boundaries of 
innovation. In this kind of system, ‘many elements are capable of making mutual adjustments 
for ordering their relationships with one another within a general systems of rules where each 
element acts with interdependence of other elements.’” Id. at 333. But, polycentric govern-
ance appears too chaotic and indeterminate to be an appropriate form of governance for outer 
space, and reduces the power of a central authority too low to effectively regulate and enforce 
activities in outer space. The scale of managing outer space compared to managing activities 
in an urban environment is too disproportionate to apply its lessons to outer space. 
442.  Cf. Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 313 (“The reigning account of the politics of 
urban land use decisions, the ‘growth machine’ account, situates land use officials as acting 
in concert with an elite coalition of developers and real estate interests primarily concerned 
with economic growth.”). 
443.  Brehm, supra note 1, at 374–75 (“By creating a system in which private entities can 
establish real property rights in their space objects and a surrounding safety zone, the proposal 
incentivizes private investment of large sums into space exploration programs. Provisions 
which authorize the right to exclude, the right to be free from interference, the exclusive right 
to appropriate resources within an established safety zone, and the right to sell real property 
further encourage private space exploration and create strong associated incentives.”); see 
BABCOCK FINAL ARTICLE 6/20/2019  1:28 PM 
250 Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 69:191 
rights would also provide incentives for expeditions to make the initial 
treks to the moon”444 and “would allow a free market to develop in 
property rights” on celestial bodies like asteroids or the moon.445 Critical 
to protecting those investments is the right of first possession.446 But, as 
also discussed earlier, “full ownership” of property in outer space, like 
the surface of an asteroid or the moon, violates Article II of the Outer 
Space Treaty, making any implementing rule a nullity.447 
One approach around the ban, allowing application of the principle, 
might be to create “a real property rights system based on jurisdictional 
sovereignty” distinguishing “between absolute territorial sovereignty and 
functional or jurisdictional sovereignty.”448 An essential part of this 
proposal is to permit “private entities to occupy locations on a first-come, 
first-served basis so long as the occupation does not interfere with the 
activities of other entities.”449 The proposal “would permit private 
property rights in outer space once a private entity made effective use of 
the property for a period of one year, and continued to use the property 
in a peaceful way that allowed for free and open use of outer space.”450 
The genesis of this proposal, according to Andrew Brehm, are the 
Homestead Acts, “which similarly encouraged private exploration and 
settlement in new frontiers.”451 The key elements of this proposal are the 
non-interference requirement and the diligence requirement.452 But, 
eventually, the land transferred to the homesteader, which was the 
incentive for undertaking the hard work in the first place.453 
Other scholars have advocated using the General Mining Law of 
1872 (GML).454 The GML not only gave the first discoverer of a valuable 
mineral the exclusive right to develop it, but also to the land around the 
discovery.455 Ownership of the land remained in the United States until 
 
also Coffey, supra note 29, at 139 (“[T]he clearest, most efficient solution to the space re-
sources question would simply be to allow comprehensive property rights, including real es-
tate ownership, in space.”). 
444.  Coffey, supra note 29, at 140. 
445.  Id. at 141. 
446.  See id. 
447.  Id. “While the OST allows a constrained claim to space resources, it does not allow 
the right to exclude under [A]rticle I’s guarantee of free access to all areas of celestial bodies.” 
Id. at 139. 
448.  Brehm, supra note 1, at 366. 
449.  Id. at 367–68. 
450.  Id. at 368. 
451.  Id. at 369. 
452.  See id. at 368. 
453.  See Brehm, supra note 1, at 369. 
454.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 667.  
455.  Id.  
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the discovering entity perfected its claim, at which point the land 
transferred to the miner.456 At that point, the proposal runs afoul of the 
OST ban, just like using the Homestead Act as a model.457 Another reason 
the models will not work in outer space is that the United States originally 
owned the land before it was transferred to a private entity.458 As no 
sovereign owns land in outer space, there is no sovereign to transfer 
anything to anybody.459 Therefore, the right of first possession rule under 
any approach cannot get over the non-appropriation hurdle of the 
international space treaties, regardless of any other attributes they may 
have, and is unworkable. 
C. Establish Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) Like Those Under 
UNCLOS 
One approach that has captured the attention of some space law 
scholars is the idea of establishing development or enterprise zones on 
celestial bodies.460 Under this approach, existing organizations could 
allocate areas on celestial bodies for the construction of installations by 
different countries “with the understanding that a certain exclusive 
economic zone would radiate from that location.”461 Nations could then 
allow activities to occur in those zones and regulate them.462 
“Alternatively, an international organization could divide celestial bodies 
into shares for each country to presently or eventually exploit, as opposed 
to a system of arising economic zones.”463 
The EEZ proposal is not that different from traditional Euclidian 
zoning to the extent it “separates incompatible land uses and excludes 
harmful ones to avoid negative spillovers” from the co-location of 
conflicting uses.464 Zoning can also be used to “control the kind of users 
allowed to consume the commons by excluding those who are likely to 
take out more than what might be considered their fair share of the 
commons and leave everyone worse off, at least fiscally.”465 
 
456.  See id. at 668, 670.  
457.  See id. at 668. 
458.  See id.  
459.  MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 668 (“The situation in space—where no sovereign 
may lay claim—is far different from the effort to exploit the American West.”). 
460.  See DiMaria supra note 28, at 433 (“Some scholars have argued that the successful 
middle ground [between res communis and res nullius] lies in exclusive zones for States to 
encourage industry but avoid giving spacefarers free reign.”).  
461.  Id. at 436.  
462.  See id. 
463.  Id. at 436–37.  
464.  Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 310. 
465.  Id. 
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Separating incompatible land uses and excluding those who might 
over-consume the commons might be a useful approach in outer space, if 
the obstacles to creating it can be overcome, which they cannot. The fact 
that the proposal assures development rights for countries creates several 
problems. First, creating an exclusive zone from which some entities are 
excluded in all likelihood would “directly interfere with the free 
exploration and use principles in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty.”466 
Second, the proposal’s administration requires the presence of an 
international organization, with its attendant problems.467 Third, given 
the difficulty tracking asteroids, monitoring and enforcing what happens 
within these zones may be very difficult.468 Fourth, depending on the 
perceived fairness of the zones and the allocation process, the proposal 
could lead to “discord” among various countries causing the possible 
dissolution of whatever civility norms had been established among 
spacefaring nations.469 
The zoning proposals to date have focused on single uses, 
principally mining.470 It is possible, however, that as conditions on the 
moon, for example, become more useful for other uses, such as a place 
from which to launch ventures into deeper outer space or for extracting 
water for use in situ or elsewhere, there may be more than one activity 
occurring in a single zone. One way to avoid one activity interfering with 
the use by another is the use of “performance zoning,” an idea Lee Anne 
Fennell proposed to allow for the agglomeration of beneficial uses to 
produce positive impacts within the zone as well as beneficial spillover 
impacts.471 Another is to adopt the idea of “poolism,” the “co-production 
of goods” and adoption of “sharing practices” in a single space, like in a 
city.472 For such an idea to work, there would have to be a system of 
 
466.  DiMaria, supra note 28, at 437.  
467.  Id. at 436–37 (discussing these problems). 
468.  Id. at 437; see also Abrams, supra note 57, at 813 (“One key characteristic of asteroids 
is that they are more difficult to track than planets or real estate on Earth. This makes an 
asteroid seem more like a chattel, which may be lost.”). 
469.  Cf. Saunders, supra note 241, at 1384 (discussing the establishment of zones with 
specific restrictions which fractured existing community norms). 
470.  See, e.g., MacWhorter, supra note 42, at 667. 
471.  Foster & Iaione, supra note 222, at 312 (internal footnote omitted) (“Because we can-
not rely upon markets to assemble urban participants optimally or to maximize the positive 
agglomeration benefits of urban common space, [Fennell] floats the idea of using ‘perfor-
mance zoning’ as a means of favoring land uses that will produce positive impacts or spillo-
vers to a particular neighborhood or to the City.”). The concept of performance outcome zon-
ing as advocated by Foster and Iaione might also be transferrable to outer space. See id. at 
313–14 (“Zoning permits would be based not on a particular type of land use but rather on 
the basis of particular targeted outcomes using performance metrics by which the positive 
impacts of that land use on communities can be assessed.”). 
472.  Id. at 340–41.  
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assembling uses in a single area of a celestial body, perhaps through 
performance zoning, and then occupants of that zone would have to be 
willing and able to collaborate.473 Assuming those obstacles can be 
surmounted, it is not clear how either of these approaches will overcome 
the exclusion problems associated with any proposal that excludes some 
users. 
D. Lotteries or Tradable Credits 
Having a lottery or an auction of “ownership rights,” or establishing 
a system of tradable credits like under the Clean Air Act’s acid rain 
provision,474 or under the prior appropriation doctrine for allocating use 
rights to a quantity of water, might be ways to lessen the equitable 
problems with the prior proposals, none of which is sensitive to the 
interests of non-developed countries.475 While an auction theoretically 
would open up the market in development rights to others than the large 
spacefaring nations, in practice one would expect that only they would be 
able to effectively bid on and then secure those rights.476 However, the 
idea of tradable credits might work.477 
Under an outer space trading system, participant nations, “regardless 
of [their] space-faring capacity, would be allocated a certain number of 
lunar mining credits. The credits would allow the holder to mine a certain 
tonnage of natural resources on the moon during a given period.”478 The 
credits could apply to the amount of the resource a participant was 
allowed to mine, regardless of location, or could be tied to a particular 
plot of land on a celestial body.479 Participants could buy and sell their 
credits to other participants.480 The openness of the process would create 
an incentive for all countries, regardless of their “spacefaring 
 
473.  See id. at 342.  
474.  42 U.S.C. §§ 7651a–7651o (2012). 
475.  See Coffey, supra note 29, at 137; DiMaria, supra note 28, at 434; Reinstein, supra 
note 1, at 90. 
476.  Cf. Reinstein, supra note 1, at 92 (“The auction occupies the middle ground between 
laissez faire privatization of space development and a belief that space is the equal birthright 
of all humanity.”). 
477.  See Taylor, supra note 31, at 279 (“Tradable allowances are more cost-effective, gen-
erate more innovation and facilitate greater global participation than any other resource man-
agement strategy. Thus, tradable allowances offer the most promising solution to the tragedy 
of the space commons.”). 
478.  Coffey, supra note 29, at 138. 
479.  Id.; see also Edwin W. Paxson, III, Sharing the Benefits of Outer Space Exploration: 
Space Law and Economic Development, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L.J. 487, 514 (1993) (“[E]ach coun-
try would be allocated a certain amount of lunar mining credits, which would allow the holder 
of the credits to engage in mining certain tonnage of natural resources on the [m]oon for a 
given period.”). 
480.  Coffey, supra note 29, at 138. 
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capacities.”481 Two additional features make this an appealing approach. 
The first of these, “tonnage limits,” will encourage countries to “make 
careful choices in where and what to mine,” assuring that valuable 
resources will still be there for countries that begin mining later, like 
developing nations.482 The other, a sunset provision, should prevent 
hoarding and speculative purchases.483 
The approach “would allow developing nations to benefit from 
space exploration and exploitation fairly, without giving them control 
over an international regime.”484 Another advantage, other than 
determining the amount of allocable credits, is that there would be no 
need for an international central authority, because participants will run 
the market.485 Coffey proposes linking the concept of tradable permits to 
an exclusive economic zone so that “[w]hen a nation exercises its credits 
on land, that land will become the exclusive economic zone of that 
nation,” but would allow others to pass through the zone “as long as they 
do not disturb it or take resources from it.”486 However, her approach 
comes close to conflicting with the prohibition against appropriating 
celestial resources. 
Yet, there are potential problems even with this promising approach. 
For example, there is still a need for some international organization to 
allocate mining credits and to determine the methodology for any 
allocation, especially how to assure that non-spacefaring nations benefit 
in some way.487 Some form of international oversight will be needed to 
“ensure that nations adhere to the rules and do not exceed their allotted 
tonnage.”488 There is an unresolved question whether commercial mining 
enterprises would be able to buy credits not only from their own country, 
but from other countries.489 Then, there is the question of whether space 
resources may legally be considered personal property, requiring a new 
international agreement to clarify that “celestial resources may legally 
belong to those who extract them.”490 Tradable credits would also need 
to be anchored by a permit, again raising the need for an administering 
 
481.  Id. The worry is that these countries might try and develop a profit distribution system 
for resources they neither undertook the risk or cost of developing that benefits them. Id.  
482.  Id.  
483.  Id. The sunset provision might also help to control how much actual mining activity 
occurs at during any given time period. Coffey, supra note 29, at 138. 
484.  Id.  
485.  Id. 
486.  Id. at 145. 
487.  Id.  
488.  Coffey, supra note 29, at 139. 
489.  Id. at 138 (“Since credits would be bought and sold among nations, it is unclear what 
role private actors such as corporations would play.”). 
490.  Id. at 139. 
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agency.491 To prevent over-consumption of permitted resources, a “time-
limited” permit based on something like the prior appropriation doctrine 
giving the first appropriator superior rights over any later appropriator 
might be a way to curb over-consumption, but might disadvantage non-
spacefaring countries who would come later to the market.492 
Therefore, tradable development credits—absent Coffey’s 
modification—is largely consistent with international law, and could 
assure equitable distribution of the benefits of space development as well 
as provide sufficient incentives for development of these resources. 
However, the approach may be too administratively encumbered and 
difficult to enforce to be worth adopting. 
E. Norms as a Management Approach493 
Norms are social rules that are promulgated and enforced by the 
community to which they apply.494 They come from communities and not 
from an outside organization or governmental entity.495 They provide 
“social meaning” for individuals in specific communities and thus 
provide the framework or understandings that guide personal behavior.496 
 
491.  Id. at 138. 
492.  DiMaria, supra note 28, at 434. Noting the similarity to water law, DiMaria says that 
valuable celestial resources  
 
 May eventually become unsustainable without imposing any equitable principles over 
a longer period of time. Without sustainable regulations in place as early as possible, 
space could eventually become saturated, excluding future parties from use and ex-
ploration by allowing exclusionary rights to prior appropriators. Although it may seem 
farfetched to prepare a legal regime with such a distant future in mind, a lack of sim-
ilarly forward thinking led to the present dilemma by leaving outer space property 
rights vague while the technology to obtain such rights ripened.  
 
 Id. at 439 (internal footnote omitted). 
493.  The descriptive portions of the text in this Section about norms and some of the sup-
porting footnotes are drawn from my article. See Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Re-
sponsibility for Improving the Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 134–42 (2009). 
494.  See Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, 
and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (“[A] social norm is an obligation backed by 
a social sanction. . . . [An] ‘obligation’ . . . [is] a statement about what people ought to do, 
such as pay taxes and clean up after their dogs. . . . [A] social sanction . . . [is a] punishment 
imposed, not by state officials, but by ordinary people, such as shunning a litigious lawyer or 
refusing to deal with a law firm that organizes hostile takeovers.”); Richard A. Posner & Eric 
B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 369, 369 (1999) (“A norm is a social rule that does not depend on govern-
ment for either promulgation or enforcement.”).  
495.  Pearl, supra note 243, at 1039. 
496.  Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental Command and Con-
trol, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 200 (2001). 
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They function as 
nonlegal rules or obligations that certain individuals feel compelled to 
follow despite the lack of formal legal sanctions, whether because 
defiance would subject them to sanctions from others (typically in the 
form of disapproval, lowered esteem, or even ostracism) or because 
they would feel guilty for failing to conform to the norm (a so-called 
internalized norm).497 
Concern about esteem is especially important in close-knit groups, which 
makes norms unlikely to have any effect on the disparate entities that 
might engage in developing outer space.498 However, if conditions were 
appropriate for the activation of norms in outer space, it is conceivable 
that a norm favoring an equitable distribution of space resources could 
arise. 
Ellickson’s study of Shasta County, California, demonstrates how 
norms that originate within a close-knit community can efficiently 
manage a CPR.499 His theory revolves around the baseline rule that 
“property rights—be they communal or individual—should be clear and 
well-known among community members.”500 Besides the absence of any 
close-knit community in outer space, the fact that property rules in outer 
space are neither clear nor well known would seem to undercut the 
application of norms as a management tool in that environment.501 
Thus, norms work as a means of controlling individual behavior 
when individuals see themselves as part of a particular group.502 When 
 
497.  Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1238 (2001); see also Alex 
Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 TUL. L. REV. 
605, 608 (2004) (“The sanctions can be based on shame or some other type of social ostra-
cism.”). “In rational actor terms, violating a social norm imposes a cost on the violator that 
can tip the cost-benefit balance in favor of conformity with the norm.” Carlson, supra, at 
1239. 
498.  David R. Karp, The New Debate About Shame in Criminal Justice: An Interactionist 
Account, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 301, 313 (2000) (“Repeated interactions give rise to habits. They 
are perceived by the actors and become expectations in the sense of predictions or anticipa-
tions of behavior . . . [E]ach actor feels constrained to live up to the expectation, partly out of 
a feeling that the other will be irritated, offended, or disappointed if the expectation is not 
fulfilled.”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Ac-
tivation Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 1101, 1105 (2005) (“Social sanctions 
will not change the individual payoff because the individual will either act in isolation or in a 
setting with insufficient iterative relationships or information exchange to enable social norm 
sanctioning to occur. . . . [S]ituations in which the individual’s actions are not observable by 
others and situations in which the actions are observable but occur in non-close-knit groups 
as loose-knit group situations.”). 
499.  Pearl, supra note 243, at 1039. 
500.  Id. 
501.  Cf. id. 
502.  Geisinger, supra note 497, at 632.  
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this happens, individuals identify with and assimilate the group norm, 
replacing individual behavior with “group-guided behavior.”503 To the 
extent that “[i]nformal norms and private ordering seek to identify 
circumstances that combine the benefits of the unmanaged commons—
freedom—with the benefits of privatization—efficiency,” they offer “an 
appealing degree of autonomy, efficiency, and freedom.”504 But, as in the 
case of the users of Pearl’s “Ogallala Aquifer,” there is no “close-knit 
group” of actors in outer space, “no shared workday affairs[,] . . . and the 
population of users is too large to enable each to sanction the other.”505 
Hence, norms as a management approach in outer space, while consistent 
with international law, inexpensive to administer, implement, and 
enforce, and capable of responding to inequitable situations, seem 
unlikely to take hold in that environment. 
F. The Public Trust Doctrine (PTD) as a Gap Filling, Place-Holding 
Management Approach506 
The PTD offers both an approach for managing an open access 
commons and a gap-filling tool until a regulatory regime is adopted.507 
The doctrine is based on the idea that the “sovereign holds certain 
common properties in trust in perpetuity for the free and unimpeded use 
of the general public.”508 The public’s right to access and use trust 
resources is never lost, and neither the government nor private individuals 
can alienate or otherwise adversely affect those resources unless for a 
comparable public purpose.509 The resources the doctrine protects “have 
 
503.  Id.   
504.  Pearl, supra note 243, at 1039.  
505.  See id. at 1061.  
506.  Parts of the descriptive portions of this Section about the PTD and some footnotes are 
drawn from articles I have written on the doctrine. See generally Hope M. Babcock, Is Using 
the Public Trust Doctrine to Protect Public Parkland from Visual Pollution Justifiable Doc-
trinal Creep?, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2015); Hope M. Babcock, Grotius, Ocean Fish Ranching, 
and the Public Trust Doctrine: Ride ‘Em Charlie Tuna, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2007); Hope 
M. Babcock, The Public Trust in Public Art: Property Law’s Case Against the Private Hoard-
ing of “Pubic Art,” 50 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author); Babcock, 
supra note 11. 
507.  See, e.g., Babcock, supra note 11, at 664–75 (advocating the use of the doctrine to 
protect migrating wildlife, discussing inadequacies of current federal and private law, and the 
capacity of the doctrine to adapt to changing societal needs); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust 
Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 
556 (1970) (arguing the PTD could achieve environmental goals until the legislation caught 
up.). 
508.  Babcock, supra note 11, at 674.  
509.  See Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Protect 
Where the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-o-Links, and Other Things that Go Bump in the 
Night, 85 IOWA L. REV. 849, 889–98 (2000) (summarizing salient aspects of the PTD). 
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long been part of a ‘taxonomy of property’ [that recognizes] the division 
of natural wealth into private and public property.”510 
“The doctrine places on governments ‘an affirmative, ongoing duty 
to safeguard the long-term preservation of those resources for the benefit 
of the general public,’”511 thus limiting the sovereign’s power on behalf 
of both present and future individuals.512 It directs the government to 
manage trust resources for public benefit, not private gain.513 It applies to 
private as well as public resources and is used to preserve the public’s 
access to CPRs.514 Government agencies have the non-rescindable power 
to revoke uses of trust resources that are inconsistent with the doctrine.515 
This effectively places a permanent easement over trust resources that 
burdens their ownership with an overriding public interest in the 
preservation of those resources.516 However, trust resources can be 
alienated in favor of private ownership, if the alienation will still serve 
the public’s interest in those resources and not interfere with trust uses of 
the remaining land.517 The PTD, therefore, protects the “people’s 
common heritage,”518 just as Article 11 of the Moon Treaty protects outer 
space as part of the common heritage of mankind.519 
 
510.  Michael C. Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate 
Change, Due Process, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 44 (2017). 
511.  Babcock, supra note 11, at 675; see also J. Peter Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine, 
Legislation, and Green Property: A Future Convergence?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 915, 918 
(2012) (“Public trust rights are understood to precede and constrain legislative action to a 
larger extent than do private property rights.”). 
512.  Babcock, supra note 11, at 675–76.  
513.  Id. at 676.  
514.  Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W.L. 
REV. 239, 275 (1992) (“Any body of law will be fuzzy around the edges; that [cannot] be 
helped. But the notion of an evolving unbounded set of communal rights—whether they are 
constitutional or common law, procedural or substantive, in all public and private property 
strips clarity, certainty, and predictability from the very core of the [PTD].”). 
515.  Babcock, supra note 509, at 892.  
516.  See id. at 893 (“One cannot construct a common law canon more offensive to the 
notion of absolute private rights in property than the [PTD].”); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. 
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (“The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in 
which the whole people are interested . . . so as to leave them entirely under the use and con-
trol of private parties . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of gov-
ernment and the preservation of the peace.”). 
517.  Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen Moses, The Public Trust as an Antimonopoly 
Doctrine, 44 B.C.  ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 17 (2017). 
518.  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983) 
(“The public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to use public property for public 
purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people’s common herit-
age[,] . . . surrendering that right . . . only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is 
consistent with the purposes of the trust.”); Christopher C. Miller, Note, To the Moon & Be-
yond: The United States and the Future of International Space Law, 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L 
L. REV. 121, 132 (2012). 
519.  Moon Treaty, supra note 120, art. 11. 
BABCOCK FINAL ARTICLE 6/20/2019  1:28 PM 
2019] The Public Trust in Space 259 
The doctrine also appears to be infinitely malleable. Original uses of 
the doctrine were restricted to only that “aspect of the public domain 
below the low-water mark on the margin of the sea and the great lakes, 
the waters over those lands, and the waters within rivers and streams of 
any consequence,”520 and covered only traditional uses of those lands, 
like fishing and navigation.521 Over time, the scope and application of the 
doctrine broadened to protect more public resources and different uses.522 
Thus, the doctrine expanded to protect new trust resources, such as dry 
sand beaches, inland lakes, groundwater, dry riverbeds, and wildlife,523 
and passive uses of those resources, like scientific study.524 The original 
link to navigable water and tidelands disappeared.525 Supporters of the 
 
520.  Sax, supra note 507. 
521.  Babcock, supra note 11, at 678–79. 
522.  Id. 
523.  Id.; see also Blumm & Moses, supra note 517, at 20 (“[T]he PTD has grown in several 
somewhat surprising ways, extending antimonopoly protection beyond tidelands and beyond 
traditional public uses while reinforcing the principle of non-alienation of natural resources.”). 
524.  See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (holding that the PTD 
protects environmental and ecological values); Lamprey v. State, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 
1893) (recognizing public recreation rights as being within the scope of the PTD, being the 
first state to do so); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 
54 (N.J. 1972) (“We have no difficulty in finding that, in this latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury, the public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the ancient prerogatives of navigation 
and fishing, but extend . . . to recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore 
activities. The [PTD], like all common law principles, should not be considered fixed or static, 
but should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it 
was created to benefit.”); Raritan Baykeeper Inc. v. City of New York, 984 N.Y.S.2d 634, 
634 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2013) (first citing 795 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 
205 N.E.2d 850 (N.Y. 1965); and then citing Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121 (N.Y. 1920)) 
(holding that the use of a municipal park for leaf composting was inconsistent with the aes-
thetics or activities typically associated with recreation and, therefore, alienated park re-
sources in violation of the PTD, and finding the activity could only be authorized by the Leg-
islature exercising “properly conferred” authority, and enjoining the facility’s operation until 
acted upon by the Legislature). 
525.  See, e.g., Save the Welwood Murray Mem’l Library Comm. v. City Council, 263 Cal. 
Rptr. 896, 904 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (invoking the PTD to block conversion of a public library 
to improve public access to nearby commercial areas); Big Sur Props. v. Mott, 132 Cal. Rptr. 
835, 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (revoking permit to cross public parkland to access private 
property); Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n of Chi., 263 N.E.2d 11, 14–15, 19 (Ill. 1970) (al-
lowing conveyance of one percent of Washington Park for a middle school and recreational 
facilities leased to the Chicago Park District only after showing that public rights in remaining 
parkland protected and use was for public purpose); Williams, 128 N.E. at 121–23 (invalidat-
ing a ten-year lease of part of Central Park for a museum for impermissibly diverting park 
resources without the state legislature’s approval); Brooklyn Park Comm’rs v. Armstrong, 45 
N.Y. 234, 243 (N.Y. 1871) (disallowing a sale of parkland due to the city’s trust obligations); 
Ellington Constr. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 549 N.Y.S.2d 405, 414 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) 
(prohibiting the re-conveyance of parkland for redevelopment); Ackerman v. Steisel, 480 
N.Y.S.2d 556, 558 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (ordering removal of city sanitation equipment 
from a park); Hoffman v. Pittsburgh, 75 A.2d 649, 654–55 (Pa. 1950) (upholding an injunc-
tion against the sale of a public square for development based on the PTD); In re Conveyance 
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doctrine successfully advocated that it be applied to “wildlife, parks, 
cemeteries, and even works of fine art,”526 while arguing more recently 
its application to the atmosphere.527 
A doctrine that imposes a perpetual duty on the sovereign to 
preserve trust resources, prevents their alienation for private benefit, 
assures public access to them, and can be invoked by anyone seems 
particularly useful as a management tool in outer space.528 The fact that 
public access to trust resources is so central to the doctrine makes it 
reflective, not contradictory, of international space law’s bar against 
appropriation of outer space and of the principle of space being the 
“province of all mankind.”529 It avoids the problems of alienation and 
exclusion associated with any of the management approaches associated 
with some form of private property and requires neither the creation of a 
new administrative authority nor the presence of a close-knit group of 
like-minded people.530 Members of the public, both rich and poor, can 
invoke and enforce the doctrine as easily as the sovereign.531 It is cost 
effective to the extent that no separate apparatus is required to implement 
it, and the doctrine has shown itself to be highly adaptable and innovative 
as different needs arise.532 It could also fill the gap in international law 
with respect to managing celestial property. Therefore, of all the 
management approaches studied here, the PTD seems the most suited to 
keep order in space until a regulatory regime is imposed. 
However, the doctrine provides no incentives for development of 
trust resources; rather, it might be used to limit or curtail that 
development, making it an imperfect, perhaps even counter-productive 
solution by itself to the extent that such development might be 
 
of 1.2 Acres of Bangor Mem’l Park to Bangor Area Sch. Dist., 567 A.2d 750, 751–53 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1989) (blocking attempted transfer of parklands for construction of an elemen-
tary school). 
526.  Erin Ryan, Comment, Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical Implications of the 
Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 31 Envtl. L. 477, 480 (2001) 
(“Scholars and practitioners have responded to Sax’s call and have advocated extending pub-
lic trust protection to [cultural assets].”).  
527.  See Blumm & Wood, supra note 510, at 23 (“The basic [Atmospheric Trust Litiga-
tion] case applies public trust principles to the atmosphere . . . .”).  
528.  See Babcock, supra note 509, at 891; Babcock, supra note 11.  
529.  See Babcock, supra note 509, at 892 (internal footnote omitted) (“Since property con-
taining trust lands is conveyed subject to the doctrine, absolute private dominion over property 
impressed with the public trust can never be granted unless it is in the public interest to do 
so.”); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
530.  See Cal. Co. v. Price, 74 So. 2d 1, 21 (La. 1954) (citing N.Y., New Haven & Hartford 
R.R. Co. v. Armstrong, 102 A. 791, 794 (Conn. 1918)). 
531.  See Babcock, supra note 11, at 676–77. 
532.  See id. at 674–75, 678. 
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beneficial.533 Modifying the doctrine to allow limited use of private 
property management approaches, like tradable development claims, 
might buffer that effect—a form of overlapping hybridity between one 
type of property, a commons, and a management regime from another, 
private property, enabled by application of the PTD. 
CONCLUSION 
“Only a legal system that accommodates both the human need for re-
sources and the necessary preservation of mankind’s common heritage 
can fulfill these criteria.”534 
The future is now with regard to the development of outer space and 
its resources—it is no longer a question of whether humans will engage 
in these activities, but how soon they will. Technically advanced 
countries and private commercial enterprises are probing outer space and 
preparing for landing on an asteroid or the moon to extract their 
resources.535 Speculators are selling deeds to the moon’s surface and 
preparing to exploit the tourism potential that space offers.536 But, the 
legal framework for managing these initiatives is almost nonexistent.537 
International treaties came into being before all this activity began in 
earnest and national laws that might apply are stunted by jurisdictional 
quandaries like the absence of national boundaries in outer space.538 
Thus, there is an urgency to figure out how to control what happens in 
outer space before its resources are irreparably damaged or permanently 
monopolized by powerful countries and individuals. 
In the absence of regulation, much of the current debate centers on 
what property regime should be applied in outer space.539 The assumption 
is that by only allowing private property rights in space, countries and 
commercial enterprises will undertake the risks and costs of space 
development.540 However, unless international space law changes, it may 
prevent this from happening. If it changes, strong management controls 
will be necessary to prevent destruction or over-consumption of celestial 
resources, as well as monopolization and competitive behavior by 
participants, which could lead to hostilities and inequities. 
 
533.  See id. at 697–700 (discussing modifications to the doctrine to lessen any controversy 
associated with its application). 
534.  Widgerow, supra note 22, at 518. 
535.  See Brehm, supra note 1; Reinstein, supra note 1; Ross, supra note 1. 
536.  See Reinstein, supra note 1; Wasser & Jobes, supra note 98. 
537.  See Reinstein, supra note 1 at 62–63. 
538.  See id. at 72.  
539.  See, e.g., Brehm supra note 1, at 374; Reinstein, supra note 1, at 72. 
540.  See DiMaria, supra note 28. 
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This Article examines various private property regimes, including 
those of less than full fee ownership, to see if any would avoid the conflict 
with the international prohibition on appropriation of outer space and its 
resources. It concludes that none will because each retains the right to 
exclude and each is insensitive to the treaties’ equity concerns. In 
contrast, considering outer space to be common is consistent with 
international space law in both respects. 
Hypothesizing that private property in outer space may yet prevail, 
this Article investigates different private property management 
approaches, such as the right of first possession, lotteries, and tradable 
development rights, to see if any would be cost effective, easy to 
implement and equitable, and would also prevent over-consumption, 
monopolization or the slide into rivalrous behavior. The Article 
concludes that each comes up short in some respect. Social norms as a 
management tool for property held in common, although compliant with 
international law, are also not up to the task. Instead, although ancient, 
the PTD, with its malleability, easy and cost-effective implementation 
and enforcement, non-consumption principle, and consistency with the 
goals that animate international space treaties, seems best suited to the 
task of protecting the public’s interests in the global commons that is 
outer space as it has done for centuries in Earth-bound commons. 
But, as its principal terrestrial use has been to protect trust resources 
from development, the doctrine needs some modification to encourage 
development of celestial resources. Hence, this Article suggests that 
modifying the PTD to allow the application of private property 
management tools, like tradable development rights, will not only allow 
development, but also will assure that when it happens, it will not be just 
profitable for a few, but will also be sustainable and equitable. 
 
